Firstpublished in Prosveshcheniye
Nos. 3-5,March-May 1913
CONTENTS:
Notes
The period of counter-revolution in Russia brought notonly "thunder and lightning" in its train,
but also disillusionmentin the movement and lack of faith in common forces. As long as people believedin "a bright future," they fought side by side irrespective ofnationality -- common questions first and foremost! But when doubt crept intopeople's hearts, they began to depart,
each to his own national tent -- letevery man count only upon himself! The "national question"
first andforemost!
At the same time aprofound upheaval was taking place in the economic life of the country. Theyear 1905 had not been in vain: one more blow had been struck at the survivalsof serfdom in the countryside. The series of good harvests which succeeded thefamine years, and the industrial
boom which followed, furthered the progress ofcapitalism. Class differentiation in the countryside, the growth of the towns,the development of trade and means of communication all took a big
strideforward. This applied particularly to the border regions. And it could not buthasten the process of economic consolidation of the nationalities of Russia.They were bound to be stirred into movement.
The"constitutional regime" established at that time also acted in thesame direction of awakening the nationalities. The spread of newspapers and ofliterature generally, a certain freedom of the press and cultural institutions,an increase in the number of national theatres, and so forth, allunquestionably helped to strengthen "national sentiments." The Duma,with its election campaign and political groups, gave fresh opportunities forgreater activity of the nations and provided a new and wide arena for theirmobilization.
And the mounting waveof militant nationalism above and the series of repressive measures taken bythe "powers that be" in vengeance on the border regions for their"love of freedom," evoked an answering wave of nationalism below,which at times took the form of crude chauvinism. The
spread of Zionism [1]among the Jews, the increase of chauvinism in Poland, Pan-Islamism among theTatars, the spread of nationalism among the Armenians, Georgians andUkrainians, the general swing of the philistine towards anti-Semitism -- allthese are generally known facts.
The wave ofnationalism swept onwards with increasing force, threatening to engulf the massof
the workers. And the more the movement for emancipation declined, the moreplentifully nationalism pushed forth its blossoms.
At this difficulttime Social-Democracy had a high mission -- to resist nationalism and toprotect the masses from the general "epidemic." For Social-Democracy,and Social-Democracy alone,
could do this, by countering nationalism with thetried weapon of internationalism, with the unity and indivisibility of theclass struggle. And the more powerfully the wave of nationalism advanced, thelouder had to be the call of Social-Democracy for fraternity and unity amongthe proletarians of all the nationalities of Russia. And in this connectionparticular firmness was demanded of the Social-Democrats of the border regions,who came into direct contact with the nationalist movement.
But not allSocial-Democrats proved equal to the task -- and this applies particularly tothe Social-Democrats of the border regions. The Bund, which had previously laidstress on the common tasks, now began to give prominence to its own specific,purely nationalist aims: it went to the length of declaring "observance ofthe Sabbath" and "recognition of Yiddish" a fighting issue inits election campaign. [2] The Bund was followed by the Caucasus; one sectionof the Caucasian Social-Democrats, which, like the rest of the CaucasianSocial-Democrats, had formerly rejected "cultural-national autonomy,"are now making it an immediate demand. [3] This is without mentioning theconference of the Liquidators, which in a diplomatic way gave its sanction tonationalist vacillations. [4]
But from this itfollows that the views of Russian Social-Democracy on the national question arenot yet clear to all Social-Democrats.
It is evident that aserious and comprehensive discussion of the national question is required.Consistent Social-Democrats must work solidly and indefatigably against the fogof nationalism, no matter from what quarter it proceeds.
What is a nation?
A nation is primarilya community, a definite community of people.
This community is notracial, nor is it tribal. The modern Italian nation was formed from Romans,Teutons, Etruscans, Greeks, Arabs, and so forth. The French nation was formedfrom Gauls, Romans, Britons, Teutons, and so on. The same must be said of theBritish, the Germans and others, who were formed into nations from people ofdiverse races and tribes.
Thus, a nation is nota racial or tribal, but a historically constituted community of people.
On the other hand, itis unquestionable that the great empires of Cyrus and Alexander could not becalled nations, although they came to be constituted historically and wereformed out of different tribes and races. They were not nations, but casual andloosely-connected conglomerations of groups, which fell apart or joinedtogether according to the victories or defeats of this or that conqueror.
Thus, a nation is nota casual or ephemeral conglomeration, but a stable community of people.
But not every stablecommunity constitutes a nation. Austria and Russia are also stable communities,but nobody calls them nations. What distinguishes a national community from astate community? The fact, among others, that a national community isinconceivable without a common language, while a state need not have a commonlanguage. The Czech nation in Austria and the Polish in Russia would beimpossible if each did not have a common language, whereas the integrity ofRussia and Austria is not affected by the fact that there are a number ofdifferent languages within their borders. We are referring, of course, to thespoken languages of the people and not to the official governmental languages.
Thus, a commonlanguage is one of the characteristic features of a nation.
This, of course, doesnot mean that different nations always and everywhere speak differentlanguages, or that all who speak one language necessarily constitute onenation. A common language for every nation, but not necessarilydifferent languages for different nations! There is no nation which at one andthe same time speaks several languages, but this does not mean that therecannot be two nations speaking the same language! Englishmen and Americansspeak one language, but they do not constitute one nation. The same is true ofthe Norwegians and the Danes, the English and the Irish.
But why, forinstance, do the English and the Americans not constitute one nation in spiteof their common language?
Firstly, because theydo not live together, but inhabit different territories. A nation is formedonly as a result of lengthy and systematic intercourse, as a result of peopleliving together generation after generation.
But people cannotlive together, for lengthy periods unless they have a common territory.Englishmen and Americans originally inhabited the same territory, England, andconstituted one nation. Later, one section of the English emigrated fromEngland to a new territory, America, and there, in the new territory, in thecourse of time, came to form the new American nation. Difference of. territoryled to the formation of different nations.
Thus, a common territoryis one of the characteristic features of a nation.
But this is not all.Common territory does not by itself create a nation. This requires, inaddition, an internal economic bond to weld the various parts of the nationinto a single whole. There is no such bond between England and America, and sothey constitute two different nations. But the Americans themselves would notdeserve to be called a nation were not the different parts of America boundtogether into an economic whole, as a result of division of labour betweenthem, the development of means of communication, and so forth.
Take the Georgians,for instance. The Georgians before the Reform inhabited a common territory andspoke one language. Nevertheless, they did not, strictly speaking, constituteone nation, for, being split up into a number of disconnected principalities,they could not share a common economic life; for centuries they waged waragainst each other and pillaged each other, each inciting the Persians andTurks against the other. The ephemeral and casual union of the principalitieswhich some successful king sometimes managed to bring about embraced at best asuperficial administrative sphere, and rapidly disintegrated owing to thecaprices of the princes and the indifference of the peasants. Nor could it beotherwise in economically disunited Georgia ... Georgia came on the scene as anation only in the latter half of the nineteenth century, when the fall ofserfdom and the growth of the economic life of the country, the development ofmeans of communication and the rise of capitalism, introduced division oflabour between the various districts of Georgia, completely shattered theeconomic isolation of the principalities and bound them together into a singlewhole.
The same must be saidof the other nations which have passed through the stage of feudalism and havedeveloped capitalism.
Thus, a commoneconomic life, economic cohesion, is one of the characteristic features ofa nation.
But even this is notall. Apart from the foregoing, one must take into consideration the specificspiritual complexion of the people constituting a nation. Nations differ notonly in their conditions of life, but also in spiritual complexion, whichmanifests itself in peculiarities of national culture. If England, America andIreland, which speak one language, nevertheless constitute three distinctnations, it is in no small measure due to the peculiar psychological make-upwhich they developed from generation to generation as a result of dissimilarconditions of existence.
Of course, by itself,psychological make-up or, as it is otherwise called, "nationalcharacter," is something intangible for the observer, but in so far as itmanifests itself in a distinctive culture common to the nation it is somethingtangible and cannot be ignored.
Needless to say,"national character" is not a thing that is fixed once and for all,but is modified by changes in the conditions of life; but since it exists atevery given moment, it leaves its impress on the physiognomy of the nation.
Thus, a commonpsychological make-up, which manifests itself in a common culture, is oneof the characteristic features of a nation.
We have now exhaustedthe characteristic features of a nation.
A nation is ahistorically constituted, stable community of people, formed on the basis of acommon language, territory, economic life, and psychological make-up manifestedin a common culture.
It goes withoutsaying that a nation, like every historical phenomenon, is subject to the lawof change, has its history, its beginning and end.
It must be emphasizedthat none of the above characteristics taken separately is sufficient to definea nation. More than that, it is sufficient for a single one of thesecharacteristics to be lacking and the nation ceases to be a nation.
It is possible toconceive of people possessing a common "national character" who,nevertheless, cannot be said to constitute a single nation if they areeconomically disunited, inhabit different territories, speak differentlanguages, and so forth. Such, for instance, are the Russian, Galician,American, Georgian and Caucasian Highland Jews, who, in our opinion, donot constitute a single nation.
It is possible toconceive of people with a common territory and economic life who neverthelesswould not constitute a single nation because they have no common language andno common "national character." Such, for instance, are the Germansand Letts in the Baltic region.
Finally, theNorwegians and the Danes speak one language, but they do not constitute asingle nation owing to the absence of the other characteristics.
It is only whenall these characteristics are present together that we have a nation.
It might appear that"national character" is not one of the characteristics but the soleessential characteristic of a nation, and that all the other characteristicsare, properly speaking, only conditions for the development of a nation,rather than its characteristics. Such, for instance, is the view held by R.Springer, and more particularly by O. Bauer, who are Social-Democratictheoreticians on the national question well known in Austria.
Let us examine theirtheory of the nation.
According to Springer, "a nation is a union ofsimilarly thinking and similarly speaking persons." It is "a culturalcommunity of modern people no longer tied to the 'soil.'" [5] (ouritalics).
Thus, a "union"of similarly thinking and similarly speaking people, no matter how disconnectedthey may be, no matter where they live, is a nation.
Bauer goes evenfurther.
"What is a nation?" he asks. "Is it acommon language which makes people a nation? But the English and the Irish ...speak the same language without, however, being one people; the Jews have nocommon language and yet are a nation." [6]
What, then, is a nation?
"A nation is a relative community ofcharacter."
But what is character, inthis case national character?
National character is "the sum total ofcharacteristics which distinguish the people of one nationality from the peopleof another nationality -- the complex of physical and spiritual characteristicswhich distinguish one nation from another."
Bauer knows, of course,that national character does not drop from the skies, and he therefore adds:
"The character of people is determined by nothingso much as by their destiny.... A nation is nothing but a community with acommon destiny" which, in turn, is determined "by the conditionsunder which people produce their means of subsistence and distribute the productsof their labour."
We thus arrive at the most"complete," as Bauer calls it, definition of a nation:
"A nation is an aggregate of people bound into acommunity of character by a common destiny."
We thus have commonnational character based on a common destiny, but not necessarily connectedwith a common territory, language or economic life.
But what in that caseremains of the nation? What common nationality can there be among people whoare economically disconnected, inhabit different territories and fromgeneration to generation speak different languages?
Bauer speaks of theJews as a nation, although they "have no common language"; but what"common destiny" and national cohesion is there, for instance,between the Georgian, Daghestanian, Russian and American Jews, who arecompletely separated from one another, inhabit different territories and speakdifferent languages?
The above-mentionedJews undoubtedly lead their economic and political life in common with theGeorgians, Daghestanians, Russians and Americans respectively, and they live inthe same cultural atmosphere as these; this is bound to leave a definiteimpress on their national character; if there is anything common to them left,it is their religion, their common origin and certain relics of the nationalcharacter. All this is beyond question. But how can it be seriously maintainedthat petrified religious rites and fading psychological relics affect the"destiny" of these Jews more powerfully than the living social,economic and cultural environment that surrounds them? And it is only on thisassumption that it is possible to speak of the Jews as a single nation at all.
What, then,distinguishes Bauer's nation from the mystical and self-sufficient"national spirit" of the spiritualists?
Bauer sets up animpassable barrier between the "distinctive feature" of nations(national character) and the "conditions" of their life, divorcingthe one from the other. But what is national character if not a reflection ofthe conditions of life, a coagulation of impressions derived from environment?How can one limit the matter to national character alone, isolating anddivorcing it from the soil that gave rise to it?
Further, what indeeddistinguished the English nation from the American nation at the end of theeighteenth and the beginning of the nineteenth centuries, when America wasstill known as New England? Not national character, of course; for theAmericans had originated from England and had brought with them to America notonly the English language, but also the English national character, which, ofcourse, they could not lose so soon; although, under the influence of the newconditions, they would naturally be developing their own specific character.Yet, despite their more or less common character, they at that time alreadyconstituted a nation distinct from England! Obviously, New England as a nationdiffered then from England as a nation not by its specific national character,or not so much by its national character, as by its environment and conditionsof life, which were distinct from those of England.
It is therefore clearthat there is in fact no single distinguishing characteristic of anation. There is only a sum total of characteristics, of which, when nationsare compared, sometimes one characteristic (national character), sometimesanother (language), or sometimes a third (territory, economic conditions),stands out in sharper relief. A nation constitutes the combination of all thesecharacteristics taken together.
Bauer's point ofview, which identifies a nation with its national character, divorces thenation from its soil and converts it into an invisible, self-contained force.The result is not a living and active nation, but something mystical,intangible and supernatural. For, I repeat, what sort of nation, for instance,is a Jewish nation which consists of Georgian, Daghestanian, Russian, Americanand other Jews, the members of which do not understand each other (since theyspeak different languages), inhabit different parts of the globe, will neversee each other, and will never act together, whether in time of peace or intime of war?!
No, it is not forsuch paper "nations" that Social-Democracy draws up its nationalprogramme. It can reckon only with real nations, which act and move, andtherefore insist on being reckoned with.
Bauer is obviouslyconfusing nation, which is a historical category, with tribe,which is an ethnographical category.
However, Bauerhimself apparently feels the weakness of his position. While in the beginningof his book he definitely declares the Jews to be a nation, he corrects himselfat the end of the book and states that "in general capitalist societymakes it impossible for them (the Jews) to continue as a nation," bycausing them to assimilate with other nations. The reason, it appears, is that"the Jews have no closed territory of settlement," whereas theCzechs, for instance, have such a territory and, according to Bauer, willsurvive as a nation. In short, the reason lies in the absence of a territory.
By arguing thus,Bauer wanted to prove that the Jewish workers cannot demand national autonomy,but he thereby inadvertently refuted his own theory, which denies that a commonterritory is one of the characteristics of a nation.
But Bauer goesfurther. In the beginning of his book he definitely declares that "theJews have no common language, and yet are a nation." But hardly hashe reached p. 130 than he effects a change of front and just as definitelydeclares that "unquestionably, no nation is possible without a commonlanguage" (our italics).
Bauer wanted to provethat "language is the most important instrument of humanintercourse," but at the same time he inadvertently proved something hedid not mean to prove, namely, the unsoundness of his own theory of nations,which denies the significance of a common language.
Thus this theory,stitched together by idealistic threads, refutes itself.
A nation is not merely a historical category but ahistorical category belonging to a definite epoch, the epoch of risingcapitalism. The process of elimination of feudalism and development ofcapitalism is at the same time a process of the constitution of people intonations. Such, for instance, was the case in Western Europe. The British,French, Germans, Italians and others were formed into nations at the time ofthe victorious advance of capitalism and its triumph over feudal disunity.
But the formation ofnations in those instances at the same time signified their conversion intoindependent national states. The British, French and other nations are at thesame time British, etc., states. Ireland, which did not participate in thisprocess, does not alter the general picture.
Matters proceededsomewhat differently in Eastern Europe. Whereas in the West nations developedinto states, in the East multi-national states were formed, states consistingof several nationalities. Such are Austria-Hungary and Russia. In Austria, theGermans proved to be politically the most developed, and they took it uponthemselves to unite the Austrian nationalities into a state. In Hungary, themost adapted for state organization were the Magyars -- the core of theHungarian nationalities -- and it was they who united Hungary. In Russia, theuniting of the nationalities was undertaken by the Great Russians, who wereheaded by a historically formed, powerful and well-organized aristocraticmilitary bureaucracy.
That was how mattersproceeded in the East.
This special methodof formation of states could take place only where feudalism had not yet beeneliminated, where capitalism was feebly' developed, where the nationalitieswhich had been forced into the background had not yet been able to consolidatethemselves economically into integral nations.
But capitalism alsobegan to develop in the Eastern states. Trade and means of communication weredeveloping. Large towns were springing up. The nations were becomingeconomically consolidated. Capitalism, erupting into the tranquil life of the nationalitieswhich had been pushed into the background, was arousing them and stirring theminto action. The development of the press and the theatre, the activity of theReichsrat (Austria) and of the Duma (Russia) were helping to strengthen"national sentiments." The intelligentsia that had arisen was beingimbued with "the national idea" and was acting in the samedirection....
But the nations whichhad been pushed into the background and had now awakened to independent life,could no longer form themselves into independent national states; theyencountered on their -path the very powerful resistance of the ruling strata ofthe dominant nations, which had long ago assumed the control of the state. Theywere too late!...
In this way theCzechs, Poles, etc., formed themselves into nations in Austria; the Croats,etc., in Hungary; the Letts, Lithuanians, Ukrainians, Georgians, Armenians,etc., in Russia. What had been an exception in Western Europe (Ireland) becamethe rule in the East.
In the West, Irelandresponded to its exceptional position by a national movement. In the East, theawakened nations were bound to respond in the same fashion.
Thus arose thecircumstances which impelled the young nations of Eastern Europe on to the pathof struggle.
The struggle beganand flared up, to be sure, not between nations as a whole, but between theruling classes of the dominant nations and of those that had been pushed intothe background. The struggle is usually conducted by the urban pettybourgeoisie of the oppressed nation against the big bourgeoisie of the dominantnation (Czechs and Germans), or by the rural bourgeoisie of the oppressednation against the landlords of the dominant nation (Ukrainians in Poland), orby the whole "national" bourgeoisie of the oppressed nations againstthe ruling nobility of the dominant nation (Poland, Lithuania and the Ukrainein Russia).
The bourgeoisie playsthe leading role.
The chief problem forthe young bourgeoisie is the problem of the market. Its aim is to sell its goodsand to emerge victorious from competition with the bourgeoisie of a differentnationality. Hence its desire to secure its "own," its"home" market. The market is the first school in which thebourgeoisie learns its nationalism.
But matters areusually not confined to the market. The semi-feudal, semi-bourgeois bureaucracyof the dominant nation intervenes in the struggle with its own methods of"arresting and preventing." The bourgeoisie -- whether big or small-- of the dominant nation is able to deal more "swiftly" and"decisively" with its competitor. "Forces" are united and aseries of restrictive measures is put into operation against the"alien" bourgeoisie, measures passing into acts of repression. The strugglespreads from the economic sphere to the political sphere. Restriction offreedom of movement, repression of language, restriction of franchise, closingof schools, religious restrictions, and so on, are piled upon the head of the"competitor." Of course, such measures are designed not only in theinterest of the bourgeois classes of the dominant nation, but also infurtherance of the specifically caste aims, so to speak, of the rulingbureaucracy.
But from the point ofview of the results achieved this is quite immaterial; the bourgeois classesand the bureaucracy in this matter go hand in hand -- whether it be inAustria-Hungary or in Russia.
The bourgeoisie ofthe oppressed nation, repressed on every hand, is naturally stirred intomovement. It appeals to its "native folk" and begins to shout aboutthe "fatherland,'; claiming that its own cause is the cause of the nationas a whole. It recruits itself an army from among its "countrymen" inthe interests of ... the "fatherland." Nor do the "folk"always remain unresponsive to its appeals; they rally around its banner: therepression from above affects them too and provokes their discontent.
Thus the nationalmovement begins.
The strength of thenational movement is determined by the degree to which the wide strata of thenation, the proletariat and peasantry, participate in it.
Whether theproletariat rallies to the banner of bourgeois nationalism depends on thedegree of development of class antagonisms, on the class consciousness anddegree of organization of the proletariat. The class-conscious proletariat hasits own tried banner, and has no need to rally to the banner of thebourgeoisie.
As far as thepeasants are concerned, their participation in the national movement dependsprimarily on the character of the repressions. If the repressions affect the"land," as was the case in Ireland, then the mass of the peasantsimmediately rally to the banner of the national movement.
On the other hand,if, for example, there is no serious anti-Russian nationalism inGeorgia, it is primarily because there are neither Russian landlords nor aRussian big bourgeoisie there to supply the fuel for such nationalism among themasses. In Georgia there is anti-Armenian nationalism; but this isbecause there is still an Armenian big bourgeoisie there which, by getting thebetter of the small and still unconsolidated Georgian bourgeoisie, drives thelatter to anti-Armenian nationalism. .
Depending on thesefactors, the national movement either assumes a mass character and steadilygrows (as in Ireland and Galicia), or is converted into a series of pettycollisions, degenerating into squabbles and "fights" over signboards(as in some of the small towns of Bohemia).
The content of thenational movement, of course, cannot everywhere be the same: it is wholly determinedby the diverse demands made by the movement. In Ireland the movement bears anagrarian character; in Bohemia it bears a "language" character; inone place the demand is for civil equality and religious freedom, in anotherfor the nation's "own" officials, or its own Diet. The diversity ofdemands not infrequently reveals the diverse features which characterize anation in general (language, territory, etc.). It is worthy of note that wenever meet with a demand based on Bauer's all-embracing "nationalcharacter." And this is natural: "national character" initself is something intangible, and, as was correctly remarked by J.Strasser, "a politician can't do anything with it." [7]
Such, in general, arethe forms and character of the national movement.
From what has beensaid it will be clear that the national struggle under the conditions of risingcapitalism is a struggle of the bourgeois classes among themselves. Sometimesthe bourgeoisie succeeds in drawing the proletariat into the national movement,and then the national struggle externally assumes a"nation-wide" character. But this is so only externally. In itsessence it is always a bourgeois struggle, one that is to the advantage andprofit mainly of the bourgeoisie.
But it does not byany means follow that the proletariat should not put up a fight against thepolicy of national oppression.
Restriction offreedom of movement, disfranchisement, repression of language, closing ofschools, and other forms of persecution affect the workers no less, if notmore, than the bourgeoisie. Such a state of affairs can only serve to retardthe free development of the intellectual forces of the proletariat of subjectnations. One cannot speak seriously of a full development of the intellectualfaculties of the Tatar or Jewish worker if he is not allowed to use his nativelanguage at meetings and lectures, and if his schools are closed down.
But the policy ofnationalist persecution is dangerous to the cause of the proletariat also onanother account. It diverts the attention of large strata from socialquestions, questions of the class struggle, to national questions, questions"common" to the proletariat and the bourgeoisie. And this creates afavourable soil for lying propaganda about "harmony of interests,"for glossing over the class interests of the proletariat and for theintellectual enslavement of the workers.
This creates aserious obstacle to the cause of uniting the workers of all nationalities. If aconsiderable proportion of the Polish workers are still in intellectual bondageto the bourgeois nationalists, if they still stand aloof from the internationallabour movement, it is chiefly because the age-old anti-Polish policy of the"powers that be" creates the soil for this bondage and hinders theemancipation of the workers from it.
But the policy ofpersecution does not stop there. It not infrequently passes from a"system" of oppression to a "system" of incitingnations against each other, to a "system" of massacres and pogroms.Of course, the latter system is not everywhere and always possible, but whereit is possible -- in the absence of elementary civil rights -- it frequentlyassumes horrifying proportions and threatens to drown the cause of unity of theworkers in blood and tears. The Caucasus and south Russia furnish numerousexamples. "Divide and rule" -- such is the purpose of the policy ofincitement. And where such a policy succeeds, it is a tremendous evil for theproletariat and a serious obstacle to the cause of uniting the workers of allthe nationalities in the state.
But the workers areinterested in the complete amalgamation of all their fellow-workers into asingle international army, in their speedy and final emancipation fromintellectual bondage to the bourgeoisie, and in the full and free developmentof the intellectual forces of their brothers, whatever nation they may belongto.
The workers thereforecombat and will continue to combat the policy of national oppression in all itsforms, from the most subtle to the most crude, as well as the policy ofinciting nations against each other in all its forms
Social-Democracy inall countries therefore proclaims the right of nations to self-determination.
The right ofself-determination means that only the nation itself has the right to determineits destiny, that no one has the right forcibly to interfere in the lifeof the nation, to destroy its schools and other institutions, to violateits habits and customs, to repress its language, or curtail itsrights.
This, of course, doesnot mean that Social-Democracy will support every custom and institution of anation. While combating the coercion of any nation, it will uphold only theright of the nation itself to determine its own destiny, at the sametime agitating against harmful customs and institutions of that nation in orderto enable the toiling strata of the nation to emancipate themselves from them.
The right ofself-determination means that a nation may arrange its life in the way itwishes. It has the right to arrange its life on the basis of autonomy. It hasthe right to enter into federal relations with other nations. It has the rightto complete secession. Nations are sovereign, and all nations have equalrights.
This, of course, doesnot mean that Social-Democracy will support every demand of a nation. A nationhas the right even to return to the old order of things; but this does not meanthat Social-Democracy will subscribe to such a decision if taken by someinstitution of a particular nation. The obligations of Social-Democracy, whichdefends the interests of the proletariat, and the rights of a nation, whichconsists of various classes, are two different things.
In fighting for theright of nations to self-determination, the aim of Social-Democracy is to put anend to the policy of national oppression, to render it impossible, and therebyto remove the grounds of strife between nations, to take the edge off thatstrife and reduce it to a minimum.
This is whatessentially distinguishes the policy of the class-conscious proletariat fromthe policy of the bourgeoisie, which attempts to aggravate and fan the nationalstruggle and to prolong and sharpen the national movement.
And that is why theclass-conscious proletariat cannot rally under the "national" flag ofthe bourgeoisie.
That is why theso-called "evolutionary national" policy advocated by Bauer cannotbecome the policy of the proletariat. Bauer's attempt to identify his"evolutionary national" policy with the policy of the "modernworking class" is an attempt to adapt the class struggle of the workers tothe struggle of the nations.
The fate of anational movement, which is essentially a bourgeois movement, is naturallybound up with the fate of the bourgeoisie. The -final disappearance of anational movement is possible only with the downfall of the bourgeoisie. Onlyunder the reign of socialism can peace be fully established. But even withinthe framework of capitalism it is possible to reduce the national struggle to aminimum, to undermine it at the root, to render it as harmless as possible tothe proletariat. This is borne out, for example, by Switzerland and America. Itrequires that the country should be democratized and the nations be given theopportunity of free development.
A nation has the right freely to determine its owndestiny. It has the right to arrange its life as it sees fit, without, ofcourse, trampling on the rights of other nations. That is beyond dispute.
But howexactly should it arrange its own life, what forms should its futureconstitution take, if the interests of the majority of the nation and, aboveall, of the proletariat are to be borne in mind?
A nation has theright to arrange its life on autonomous lines. It even has the right to secede.But this does not mean that it should do so under all circumstances, thatautonomy, or separation, will everywhere and always be advantageous for anation, i.e., for its majority, i.e., for the toiling strata. TheTranscaucasian Tatars as a nation may assemble, let us say, in their Diet and,succumbing to the influence of their beys and mullahs, decide to restore theold order of things and to secede from the state. According to the meaning ofthe clause on self-determination they are fully entitled to do so. But willthis be in the interest of the toiling strata of the Tatar nation? CanSocial-Democracy look on indifferently when the beys and mullahs assume theleadership of the masses in the solution of the national question?
Should notSocial-Democracy interfere in the matter and influence the will of the nationin a definite way? Should it not come forward with a definite plan for thesolution of the question, a plan which would be most advantageous for the Tatarmasses?
But what solutionwould be most compatible with the interests of the toiling masses? Autonomy,federation or separation?
All these areproblems the solution of which will depend on the concrete historicalconditions in which the given nation finds itself.
More than that;conditions, like everything else, change, and a decision which is correct atone particular time may prove to be entirely unsuitable at another.
In the middle of thenineteenth century Marx was in favour of the secession of Russian Poland; andhe was right, for it was then a question of emancipating a higher culture froma lower culture that was destroying it. And the question at that time was notonly a theoretical one, an academic question, but a practical one, a questionof actual reality....
At the end of the nineteenthcentury the Polish Marxists were already declaring against the secession ofPoland; and they too were right, for during the fifty years that had elapsedprofound changes had taken place, bringing Russia and Poland closereconomically and culturally. Moreover, during that period the question ofsecession had been converted from a practical matter into a matter of academicdispute, which excited nobody except perhaps intellectuals abroad.
This, of course, byno means precludes the possibility that certain internal and externalconditions may arise in which the question of the secession of Poland may againcome on the order of the day.
The solution of thenational question is possible only in connection with the historical conditionstaken in their development.
The economic,political and cultural conditions of a given nation constitute the only key tothe question how a particular nation ought to arrange its life and whatforms its future constitution ought to take. It is possible that a specificsolution of the question will be required for each nation. If the dialecticalapproach to a question is required anywhere it is required here, in thenational question.
In view of this wemust declare our decided opposition to a certain very widespread, but verysummary manner of "solving" the national question, which owes itsinception to the Bund. We have in mind the easy method of referring to Austrianand South-Slav [8] Social-Democracy, which has supposedly already solved thenational question and whose solution the Russian Social-Democrats should simplyborrow. It is assumed that whatever, say, is right for Austria is also rightfor Russia. The most important and decisive factor is lost sight of here,namely, the concrete historical conditions in Russia as a whole and in the lifeof each of the nations inhabiting Russia in particular.
Listen, for example,to what the well-known Bundist, V. Kossovsky, says:
"When at the Fourth Congress of the Bund theprinciples of the question (i.e., the national question -- J. St.) werediscussed, the proposal made by one of the members of the congress to settlethe question in the spirit of the resolution of the South-SlavSocial-Democratic Party met with general approval." [9]
And the result was that"the congress unanimously adopted" ... national autonomy.
And that was all! Noanalysis of the actual conditions in Russia, no investigation of the conditionof the Jews in Russia. They first borrowed the solution of the South-SlavSocial-Democratic Party, then they "approved" it, and finally they"unanimously adopted" it! This is the way the Bundists present and"solve" the national question in Russia....
As a matter of fact,Austria and Russia represent entirely different conditions. This explains whythe Social-Democrats in Austria, when they adopted their national programme atBrünn (1899) [10] in the spirit of the resolution of the South-SlavSocial-Democratic Party (with certain insignificant amendments, it is true),approached the question in an entirely non-Russian way, so to speak, and, ofcourse, solved it in a non-Russian way.
First, as to thepresentation of the question. How is the question presented by the Austriantheoreticians of cultural-national autonomy, the interpreters of the Brünnnational programme and the resolution of the South-Slav Social-DemocraticParty, Springer and Bauer?
"Whether a multi-national state ispossible," says Springer, "and whether, in particular, the Austriannationalities are obliged to form a single political entity, is a question weshall not answer here but shall assume to be settled. For anyone who will notconcede this possibility and necessity, our investigation will, of course, bepurposeless. Our theme is as follows: inasmuch as these nations are obligedto live together, what legal forms will enable them to live togetherin the best possible way?" (Springer's italics). [11]
Thus, the starting point isthe state integrity of Austria.
Bauer says the samething:
"We therefore start from the assumption that theAustrian nations will remain in the same state union in which they exist atpresent and inquire how the nations within this union will arrange theirrelations among themselves and to the state."
Here again the first thingis the integrity of Austria.
Can RussianSocial-Democracy present the question in this way? No, it cannot. And itcannot because from the very outset it holds the view of the right of nationsto self-determination, by virtue of which a nation has the right of secession.
Even the Bundist Goldblattadmitted at the Second Congress of Russian Social-Democracy that the lattercould not abandon the standpoint of self-determination. Here is what Goldblattsaid on that occasion:
"Nothing can be said against the right ofself-determination. If any nation is striving for independence, we must notoppose it. If Poland does not wish to enter into lawful wedlock with Russia, itis not for us to interfere with her."
All this is true. But itfollows that the starting points of the Austrian and Russian Social-Democrats,far from being identical, are diametrically opposite. After this, can there beany question of borrowing the national programme of the Austrians?
Furthermore, theAustrians hope to achieve the "freedom of nationalities" by means ofpetty reforms, by slow steps. While they propose cultural-national autonomy asa practical measure, they do not count on any radical change, on a democraticmovement for liberation, which they do not even contemplate. The RussianMarxists, on the other hand, associate the "freedom of nationalities"with a probable radical change, with a democratic movement for liberation,having no grounds for counting on reforms. And this essentially alters mattersin regard to the probable fate of the nations of Russia.
"Of course," says Bauer, "there islittle probability that national autonomy will be the result of a greatdecision, of a bold action. Austria will develop towards national autonomy stepby step, by a slow process of development, in the course of a severe struggle,as a consequence of which legislation and administration will be in a state ofchronic paralysis. The new constitution will not be created by a greatlegislative act, but by a multitude of separate enactments for individualprovinces and individual communities."
Springer says the samething.
"I am very well aware," he writes,"that institutions of this kind (i.e., organs of national autonomy -- J.St.) are not created in a single year or a single decade. Thereorganization of the Prussian administration alone took considerable time....It took the Prussians two decades finally to establish their basicadministrative institutions. Let nobody think that I harbour any illusions asto the time required and the difficulties to be overcome in Austria."
All this is very definite.But can the Russian Marxists avoid associating the national question with"bold actions"? Can they count on partial reforms, on "amultitude of separate enactments" as a means for achieving the"freedom of nationalities"? But if they cannot and must not do so, isit not clear that the methods of struggle of the Austrians and the Russians andtheir prospects must be entirely different? How in such a state of affairs canthey confine themselves to the one-sided, milk-and-water cultural-nationalautonomy of the Austrians? One or the other: either those who are in favour ofborrowing do not count on "bold actions" in Russia, or they do counton such actions but "know not what they do."
Finally, theimmediate tasks facing Russia and Austria are entirely different andconsequently dictate different methods of solving the national question. InAustria parliamentarism prevails, and under present conditions no developmentin Austria is possible without parliament. But parliamentary life andlegislation in Austria are frequently brought to a complete standstill bysevere conflicts between the national parties. That explains the chronicpolitical crisis from which Austria has for a long time been suffering. Hence,in Austria the national question is the very hub of political life; it is thevital question. It is therefore not surprising that the AustrianSocial-Democratic politicians should first of all try in one way or another tofind a solution for the national conflicts -- of course on the basis of theexisting parliamentary system, by parliamentary methods....
Not so with Russia.In the first place, in Russia "there is no parliament, thank God."[13] In the second place -- and this is the main point -- the hub of thepolitical life of Russia is not the national but the agrarian question.Consequently, the fate of the Russian problem, and, accordingly, the"liberation" of the nations too, is bound up in Russia with thesolution of the agrarian question, i.e., with the destruction of the relics offeudalism, i.e., with the democratization of the country. That explains why inRussia the national question is not an independent and decisive one, but a partof the general and more important question of the emancipation of the country.
"The barrenness of the Austrian parliament,"writes Springer, "is due precisely to the fact that every reform givesrise to antagonisms within the national parties which may affect their unity.The leaders of the parties, therefore, avoid everything that smacks of reform.Progress in Austria is generally conceivable only if the nations are grantedindefeasible legal rights which will relieve them of the necessity ofconstantly maintaining national militant groups in parliament and will enablethem to turn their attention to the solution of economic and socialproblems."
Bauer says the same thing.
"National peace is indispensable first of all forthe state. The state cannot permit legislation to be brought to a standstill bythe very stupid question of language or by every quarrel between excited peopleon a linguistic frontier, or over every new school."
All this is clear. But itis no less clear that the national question in Russia is on an entirelydifferent plane. It is not the national, but the agrarian question , thatdecides the fate of progress in Russia. The national question is a subordinateone.
And so we havedifferent presentations of the question, different prospects and methods ofstruggle, different immediate tasks. Is it not clear that, such being the stateof affairs, only pedants who "solve" the national question withoutreference to space and time can think of adopting examples from Austria and ofborrowing a programme?
To repeat: theconcrete historical conditions as the starting point, and the dialecticalpresentation of the question as the only correct way of presenting it -- suchis the key to solving the national question.
We spoke above of the formal aspect of the Austriannational programme and of the methodological grounds which make it impossiblefor the Russian Marxists simply to adopt the example of AustrianSocial-Democracy and make the latter's programme their own.
Let us now examinethe essence of the programme itself
What then is thenational programme of the Austrian Social-Democrats?
It is expressed intwo words: cultural-national autonomy.
This means, firstly,that autonomy would be granted, let us say, not to Bohemia or Poland, which areinhabited mainly by Czechs and Poles, but to Czechs and Poles generally,irrespective of territory, no matter what part of Austria they inhabit.
That is why thisautonomy is called national and not territorial.
It means, secondly,that the Czechs, Poles, Germans, and so on, scattered over the various parts ofAustria, taken personally, as individuals, are to be organized into integralnations, and are as such to form part of the Austrian state. In this wayAustria would represent not a union of autonomous regions, but a union ofautonomous nationalities, constituted irrespective of territory.
It means, thirdly,that the national institutions which are to be created for this purpose for thePoles, Czechs, and so forth, are to have jurisdiction only over"cultural," not "political" questions. Specifically politicalquestions would be reserved for the Austrian parliament (the Reichsrat).
That is why thisautonomy is also called cultural, cultural-national autonomy.
And here is the textof the programme adopted by the Austrian Social-Democratic Party at the BrünnCongress in 1899. [14]
Having referred tothe fact that "national dissension in Austria is hindering politicalprogress," that "the final solution of the national question... isprimarily a cultural necessity," and that "the solution is possible onlyin a genuinely democratic society, constructed on the basis of universal,direct and equal suffrage," the programme goes on to say:
"The preservation and development of the nationalpeculiarities [15] of the peoples ofAustria is possible only on the basis of equal rights and by avoiding alloppression. Hence, all bureaucratic state centralism and the feudal privilegesof individual provinces must first of all be rejected.
"Under these conditions, and only underthese conditions, will it be possible to establish national order in Austria inplace of national dissension, namely, on the following principles:
"1. Austria must be transformed into ademocratic state federation of nationalities.
"2. The historical crown provinces must bereplaced by nationally delimited self-governing corporations, in each of whichlegislation and administration shall be entrusted to national parliamentselected on the basis of universal, direct and equal suffrage.
"3. All the self-governing regions of oneand the same nation must jointly form a single national union, which shallmanage its national affairs on an absolutely autonomous basis.
"4. The rights of national minorities mustbe guaranteed by a special law passed by the Imperial Parliament."
The programme ends with anappeal for the solidarity of all the nations of Austria. [16]
It is not difficultto see that this programme retains certain traces of"territorialism," but that in general it gives a formulation ofnational autonomy. It is not without good reason that Springer, the firstagitator on behalf of cultural-national autonomy, greets it with enthusiasm;Bauer also supports this programme, calling it a "theoreticalvictory" for national autonomy; only, in the interests of greater clarity,he proposes that Point 4 be replaced by a more definite formulation, whichwould declare the necessity of "constituting the national minority withineach self-governing region into a public corporation" for the managementof educational and other cultural affairs.
Such is the nationalprogramme of Austrian Social-Democracy.
Let us examine itsscientific foundations.
Let us see how theAustrian Social-Democratic Party justifies the cultural-national autonomy itadvocates.
Let us turn to thetheoreticians of cultural-national autonomy, Springer and Bauer.
The starting point ofnational autonomy is the conception of a nation as a union of individualswithout regard to a definite territory.
"Nationality," according to Springer,"is not essentially connected with territory"; nations are"autonomous unions of persons."
Bauer also speaks of anation as a "community of persons" which does not enjoy"exclusive sovereignty in any particular region."
But the personsconstituting a nation do not always live in one compact mass; they arefrequently divided into groups, and in that form are interspersed among aliennational organisms. It is capitalism which drives them into various regions andcities in search of a livelihood. But when they enter foreign nationalterritories and there form minorities, these groups are made to suffer by thelocal national majorities in the way of restrictions on their language,schools, etc. Hence national conflicts. Hence the "unsuitability" ofterritorial autonomy. The only solution to such a situation, according toSpringer and Bauer, is to organize the minorities of the given nationalitydispersed over various parts of the state into a single, general, inter-classnational union. Such a union alone, in their opinion, can protect the culturalinterests of national minorities, and it alone is capable of putting an end tonational discord.
"Hence the necessity," says Springer,"to organize the nationalities, to invest them with rights andresponsibilities...." Of course, "a law is easily drafted, but willit be effective? "... "If one wants to make a law for nations, onemust first create the nations..." "Unless the nationalities areconstituted it is impossible to create national rights and eliminate nationaldissension."
Bauer expressed himself in thesame spirit when he proposed, as "a demand of the working class,"that "the minorities should be constituted into public corporations basedon the personal principle."
But how is a nationto be organized? How is one to determine to what nation any given individualbelongs?
"Nationality," says Springer, "will bedetermined by certificates; every individual domiciled in a given region mustdeclare his affiliation to one of the nationalities of that region."
"The personal principle," says Bauer,"presumes that the population will be divided into nationalities.... Onthe basis of the free declaration of the adult citizens national registers mustbe drawn up."
Further.
"All the Germans in nationally homogeneousdistricts," says Bauer, "and all the Germans entered in the nationalregisters in the dual districts will constitute the German nation and elect a NationalCouncil."
The same applies to theCzechs, Poles, and so on.
"The National Council," according toSpringer, "is the cultural parliament of the nation, empowered toestablish the principles and to grant funds, thereby assuming guardianship overnational education, national literature, art and science, the formation ofacademies, museums, galleries, theatres," etc.
Such will be the organizationof a nation and its central institution.
According to Bauer,the Austrian Social-Democratic Party is striving, by the creation of theseinter-class institutions "to make national culture ... the possession ofthe whole people and thereby unite all the members of the nation into anational-cultural community." (our italics).
One might think thatall this concerns Austria alone. But Bauer does not agree. He emphaticallydeclares that national autonomy is essential also for other states which, likeAustria, consist of several nationalities.
"In the multi-national state," according toBauer, "the working class of all the nations opposes the national powerpolicy of the propertied classes with the demand for national autonomy."
Then, imperceptibly substitutingnational autonomy for the self-determination of nations, he continues:
"Thus, national autonomy, the self-determinationof nations, will necessarily become the constitutional programme of theproletariat of all the nations in a multi-national state."
But he goes still further.He profoundly believes that the inter-class "national unions""constituted" by him and Springer will serve as a sort of prototypeof the future socialist society. For he knows that "the socialist systemof society... will divide humanity into nationally delimited communities";that under socialism there will take place "a grouping of humanity intoautonomous national communities," that thus, "socialist society willundoubtedly present a checkered picture of national unions of persons andterritorial corporations, and that accordingly "the socialist principle ofnationality is a higher synthesis of the national principle and nationalautonomy."
Enough, it wouldseem..
These are thearguments for cultural-national autonomy as given in the works of Bauer andSpringer.
The first thing thatstrikes the eye is the entirely inexplicable and absolutely unjustifiablesubstitution of national autonomy for self-determination of nations. One or theother: either Bauer failed to understand the meaning of self-determination, orhe did understand it but for some reason or other deliberately narrowed itsmeaning. For there is no doubt a) that cultural-national autonomy presupposesthe integrity of the multi-national state, whereas self-determination goesoutside the framework of this integrity, and b) that self-determination endowsa nation with complete rights, whereas national autonomy endows it only with"cultural" rights. That in the first place.
In the second place,a combination of internal and external conditions is fully possible at somefuture time by virtue of which one or another of the nationalities may decideto secede from a multi-national state, say from Austria. Did not the RuthenianSocial-Democrats at the Brünn Party Congress announce their readiness to unitethe "two parts" of their people into one whole? [17] What, in such acase, becomes of national autonomy, which is "inevitable for theproletariat of all the nations"? What sort of "solution" ofthe problem is it that mechanically squeezes nations into the Procrustean bedof an integral state?
Further: Nationalautonomy is contrary to the whole course of development of nations. It callsfor the organization of nations; but can they be artificially welded togetherif life, if economic development tears whole groups from them and dispersesthese groups over various regions? There is no doubt that in the early stagesof capitalism nations become welded together. But there is also no doubt thatin the higher stages of capitalism a process of dispersion of nations sets in,a process whereby a whole number of groups separate off from the nations, goingoff in search of a livelihood and subsequently settling permanently in otherregions of the state; in the course of this these settlers lose their oldconnections and acquire new ones in their new domicile, and from generation togeneration acquire new habits and new tastes, and possibly a new language. Thequestion arises: is it possible to unite into a single national union groupsthat have grown so distinct? Where are the magic links to unite what cannot beunited? Is it conceivable that, for instance, the Germans of the BalticProvinces and the Germans of Transcaucasia can be "united into a singlenation"? But if it is not conceivable and not possible, wherein doesnational autonomy differ from the utopia of the old nationalists, whoendeavoured to turn back the wheel of history?
But the unity of anation diminishes not only as a result of migration. It diminishes also from internalcauses, owing to the growing acuteness of the class struggle. In the earlystages of capitalism one can still speak of a "common culture" of theproletariat and the bourgeoisie. But as large-scale industry develops and theclass struggle becomes more and more acute, this "common culture"begins to melt away. One cannot seriously speak of the "commonculture" of a nation when employers and workers of one and the same nationcease to understand each other. What "common destiny" can there bewhen the bourgeoisie thirsts for war, and the proletariat declares "war onwar"? Can a single inter-class national union be formed from such opposedelements? And, after this, can one speak of the "union of all the membersof the nation into a national-cultural community"? Is it not obvious thatnational autonomy is contrary to the whole course of the class struggle?
But let us assume fora moment that the slogan "organize the nation" is practicable. Onemight understand bourgeois-nationalist parliamentarians endeavouring to"organize" a nation for the purpose of securing additional votes. Butsince when have Social-Democrats begun to occupy themselves with"organizing" nations, "constituting" nations,"creating" nations?
What sort ofSocial-Democrats are they who in the epoch of extreme intensification of theclass struggle organize inter-class national unions? Until now the Austrian, aswell as every other, Social-Democratic party, had one task before it: namely,to organize the proletariat. That task has apparently become"antiquated." Springer and Bauer are now setting a "new"task, a more absorbing task, namely, to "create," to"organize" a nation.
However, logic hasits obligations: he who adopts national autonomy must also adopt this"new" task;
but to adopt thelatter means to abandon the class position and to take the path of nationalism.
Springer's andBauer's cultural-national autonomy is a subtle form of nationalism.
And it is by no meansfortuitous that the national programme of the Austrian Social-Democrats enjoinsa concern for the "preservation and development of thenational peculiarities of the peoples." Just think: to"preserve" such "national peculiarities" of theTranscaucasian Tatars as self-flagellation at the festival of Shakhsei-Vakhsei;or to "develop" such "national peculiarities" of theGeorgians as the vendetta! ...
A demand of thischaracter is in place in an outright bourgeois nationalist programme; and if itappears in the programme of the Austrian Social-Democrats it is because nationalautonomy tolerates such demands, it does not contradict them.
But if nationalautonomy is unsuitable now, it will be still more unsuitable in the future,socialist society.
Bauer's prophecyregarding the "division of humanity into nationally delimitedcommunities" is refuted by the whole course of development of modern humansociety. National barriers are being demolished and are falling, rather thanbecoming firmer. As early as the 'forties Marx declared that "nationaldifferences and antagonisms between peoples are daily more and morevanishing" and that "the supremacy of the proletariat will cause themto vanish still faster." [18] The subsequent development of mankind,accompanied as it was by the colossal growth of capitalist production, thereshuffling of nationalities and the union of people within ever largerterritories, emphatically confirms Marx's thought.
Bauer's desire torepresent socialist society as a "checkered picture of national unions ofpersons and territorial corporations" is a timid attempt to substitute forMarx's conception of socialism a revised version of Bakunin's conception. Thehistory of socialism proves that every such attempt contains the elements ofinevitable failure.
There is no need tomention the kind of "socialist principle of nationality" glorified byBauer, which, in our opinion, substitutes for the socialist principle of the classstruggle the bourgeois "principle of nationality." Ifnational autonomy is based on such a dubious principle, it must be admittedthat it can only cause harm to the working-class movement.
True, suchnationalism is not so transparent, for it is skilfully masked by socialistphrases, but it is all the more harmful to the proletariat for that reason. Wecan always cope with open nationalism, for it can easily be discerned. It ismuch more difficult to combat nationalism when it is masked and unrecognizablebeneath its mask. Protected by the armour of socialism, it is less vulnerableand more tenacious. Implanted among the workers, it poisons the atmosphere andspreads harmful ideas of mutual distrust and segregation among the workers ofthe different nationalities.
But this does notexhaust the harm caused by national autonomy. It prepares the ground not onlyfor the segregation of nations, but also for breaking up the united labourmovement. The idea of national autonomy creates the psychological conditionsfor the division of the united workers' party into separate parties built onnational lines. The breakup of the party is followed by the breakup of thetrade unions, and complete segregation is the result. In this way the unitedclass movement is broken up into separate national rivulets.
Austria, the home of"national autonomy," provides the most deplorable examples of this.As early as 1897 (the Wimberg Party Congress [19]) the once united AustrianSocial-Democratic Party began to break up into separate parties. The breakupbecame still more marked after the Brünn Party Congress (1899), which adoptednational autonomy. Matters have finally come to such a pass that in place of aunited international party there are now six national parties, of which theCzech Social-Democratic Party will not even have anything to do with the GermanSocial-Democratic Party.
But with the partiesare associated the trade unions. In Austria, both in the parties and in thetrade unions, the main brunt of the work is borne by the same Social-Democraticworkers. There was therefore reason to fear that separatism in the party wouldlead to separatism in the trade unions and that the trade unions would alsobreak up. That, in fact, is what happened: the trade unions have also dividedaccording to nationality. Now things frequently go so far that the Czechworkers will even break a strike of German workers, or will unite at municipalelections with the Czech bourgeois against the German workers.
It will be seen fromthe foregoing that cultural-national autonomy is no solution of the nationalquestion. Not only that, it serves to aggravate and confuse the question bycreating a situation which favours the destruction of the unity of the labourmovement, fosters the segregation of the workers according to nationality andintensifies friction among them.
Such is the harvestof national autonomy.
We said above that Bauer, while granting the necessityof national autonomy for the Czechs, Poles, and so on, nevertheless opposessimilar autonomy for the Jews. In answer to the question, "Should theworking class demand autonomy for the Jewish people?" Bauer says that"national autonomy cannot be demanded by the Jewish workers."According to Bauer, the reason is that "capitalist society makes itimpossible for them (the Jews -- J. St.) to continue as a nation."
In brief, the Jewishnation is coming to an end, and hence there is nobody to demand nationalautonomy for. The Jews are being assimilated.
This view of the fateof the Jews as a nation is not a new one. It was expressed by Marx as early asthe 'forties, [20] [21] in reference chiefly to the German Jews. It wasrepeated by Kautsky in 1903, [22] in reference to the Russian Jews. It is nowbeing repeated by Bauer in reference to the Austrian Jews, with the difference,however, that he denies not the present but the future of the Jewish nation.
Bauer explains theimpossibility of preserving the existence of the Jews as a nation by the factthat "the Jews have no closed territory of settlement." Thisexplanation, in the main a correct one, does not however express the whole truth.The fact of the matter is primarily that among the Jews there is no large andstable stratum connected with the land, which would naturally rivet the nationtogether, serving not only as its framework but also as a "national"market. Of the five or six million Russian Jews, only three to four per centare connected with agriculture in any way. The remaining ninety-six per centare employed in trade, industry, in urban institutions, and in general are towndwellers; moreover, they are spread all over Russia and do not constitute amajority in a single gubernia.
Thus, interspersed asnational minorities in areas inhabited by other nationalities, the Jews as arule serve "foreign" nations as manufacturers and traders and asmembers of the liberal professions, naturally adapting themselves to the"foreign nations" in respect to language and so forth. All this,taken together with the increasing re-shuffling of nationalities characteristicof developed forms of capitalism, leads to the assimilation of the Jews. Theabolition of the "Pale of Settlement" would only serve to hasten thisprocess of assimilation.
The question ofnational autonomy for the Russian Jews consequently assumes a somewhat curiouscharacter: autonomy is being proposed for a nation whose future is denied andwhose existence has still to be proved!
Nevertheless, thiswas the curious and shaky position taken up by the Bund when at its SixthCongress (1905) it adopted a "national programme" on the fines ofnational autonomy.
Two circumstancesimpelled the Bund to take this step.
The firstcircumstance is the existence of the Bund as an organization of Jewish, andonly Jewish, Social-Democratic workers. Even before 1897 the Social-Democraticgroups active among the Jewish workers set themselves the aim of creating"a special Jewish workers' organization." [23] They founded such anorganization in 1897 by uniting to form the Bund. That was at a time whenRussian Social-Democracy as an integral body virtually did not yet exist. The Bundsteadily grew and spread, and stood out more and more vividly against thebackground of the bleak days of Russian Social-Democracy.... Then came the1900's. A mass labour movement came into being. Polish Social-Democracygrew and drew the Jewish workers into the mass struggle. RussianSocial-Democracy grew and attracted the "Bund" workers. Lacking aterritorial basis, the national framework of the Bund became too restrictive.The Bund was faced with the problem of either merging with the general internationaltide, or of upholding its independent existence as an extra-territorialorganization. The Bund chose the latter course.
Thus grew up the"theory" that the Bund is "the sole representative of the Jewishproletariat."
But to justify thisstrange "theory" in any "simple" way became impossible.Some kind of foundation "on principle," some justification "onprinciple," was needed. Cultural-national autonomy provided such afoundation. The Bund seized upon it, borrowing it from the AustrianSocial-Democrats. If the Austrians had not had such a programme the Bund wouldhave invented it in order to justify its independent existence "onprinciple."
Thus, after a timidattempt in 1901 (the Fourth Congress), the Bund definitely adopted a"national programme" in 1905 (the Sixth Congress).
The secondcircumstance is the peculiar position of the Jews as separate nationalminorities within compact majorities of other nationalities in integralregions. We have already said that this position is undermining the existenceof the Jews as a nation and puts them on the road to assimilation. But this isan objective process. Subjectively, in the minds of the Jews, it provokes areaction and gives rise to the demand for a guarantee of the rights of anational minority, for a guarantee against assimilation. Preaching as it doesthe vitality of the Jewish "nationality," the Bund could not avoidbeing in favour of a "guarantee." And, having taken up this position,it could not but accept national autonomy. For if the Bund could seize upon anyautonomy at all, it could only be national autonomy, i.e., cultural-nationalautonomy; there could be no question of territorial-political autonomy for theJews, since the Jews have no definite integral territory.
It is noteworthy thatthe Bund from the outset stressed the character of national autonomy as aguarantee of the rights of national minorities, as a guarantee of the"free development" of nations. Nor was it fortuitous that therepresentative of the Bund at the Second Congress of the RussianSocial-Democratic Party, Goldblatt, defined national autonomy as"institutions which guarantee them (i.e., nations -- J. St.)complete freedom of cultural development." [24] A similar proposal wasmade by supporters of the ideas of the Bund to the Social-Democratic group inthe Fourth Duma....
In this way the Bundadopted the curious position of national autonomy for the Jews.
We have examinedabove national autonomy in general. The examination showed that nationalautonomy leads to nationalism. We shall see later that the Bund has arrived atthe same end point. But the Bund also regards national autonomy from a specialaspect, namely, from the aspect of guarantees of the rights of nationalminorities. Let us also examine the question from this special aspect. It isall the more necessary since the problem of national minorities -- and not ofthe Jewish minorities alone -- is one of serious moment for Social-Democracy.
And so, it is aquestion of "institutions which guarantee" nations"complete freedom of cultural development" (our italics -- J. St.).
But what are these"institutions which guarantee," etc.?
They are primarilythe "National Council" of Springer and Bauer, something in the natureof a Diet for cultural affairs.
But can theseinstitutions guarantee a nation "complete freedom of culturaldevelopment"? Can a Diet for cultural affairs guarantee a nation againstnationalist persecution?
The Bund believes itcan.
But history provesthe contrary.
At one time a Dietexisted in Russian Poland. It was a political Diet and, of course, endeavouredto guarantee freedom of "cultural development" for the Poles. But,far from succeeding in doing so, it itself succumbed in the unequal struggleagainst the political conditions generally prevailing in Russia.
A Diet has been inexistence for a long time in Finland, and it too endeavours to protect theFinnish nationality from "encroachments," but how far it succeeds indoing so everybody can see.
Of course, there areDiets and Diets, and it is not so easy to cope with the democraticallyorganized Finnish Diet as it was with the aristocratic Polish Diet. But the decisivefactor, nevertheless, is not the Diet, but the general regime in Russia. Ifsuch a grossly Asiatic social and political regime existed in Russia now as inthe past, at the time the Polish Diet was abolished, things would go muchharder with the Finnish Diet. Moreover, the policy of "encroachments"upon Finland is growing, and it cannot be said that it has met with defeat....
If such is the casewith old, historically evolved institutions -- political Diets -- still lesswill young Diets, young institutions, especially such feeble institutions as"cultural" Diets, be able to guarantee the free development ofnations.
Obviously, it is nota question of "institutions," but of the general regime prevailing inthe country. If there is no democracy in the country there can be no guaranteesof "complete freedom for cultural development" of nationalities. Onemay say with certainty that the more democratic a country is the fewer are the"encroachments" made on the "freedom of nationalities," andthe greater are the guarantees against such "encroachments."
Russia is asemi-Asiatic country, and therefore in Russia the policy of"encroachments" not infrequently assumes the grossest form, the formof pogroms. It need hardly be said that in Russia "guarantees" havebeen reduced to the very minimum.
Germany is, however,European, and she enjoys a measure of political freedom. It is not surprisingthat the policy of "encroachments" there never takes the form ofpogroms.
In France, of course,there are still more "guarantees," for France is more democratic thanGermany.
There is no need tomention Switzerland, where, thanks to her highly developed, although bourgeoisdemocracy, nationalities live in freedom, whether they are a minority or amajority.
Thus the Bund adoptsa false position when it asserts that "institutions" by themselvesare able to guarantee complete cultural development for nationalities.
It may be said thatthe Bund itself regards the establishment of democracy in Russia as a preliminarycondition for the "creation of institutions" and guarantees offreedom. But this is not the case. From the report of the Eighth Conference ofthe Bund [25] it will be seen that the Bund thinks it can secure"institutions" on the basis of the present system in Russia,by "reforming" the Jewish community.
"The community," one of the leaders of theBund said at this conference, "may become the nucleus of futurecultural-national autonomy. Cultural-national autonomy is a form ofself-service on the part of nations, a form of satisfying national needs. Thecommunity form conceals within itself a similar content. They are links in thesame chain, stages in the same evolution." [26]
On this basis, theconference decided that it was necessary to strive "for reformingthe Jewish community and transforming it by legislative means into asecular institution," democratically organized (our italics -- J. St.).
It is evident thatthe Bund considers as the condition and guarantee not the democratization ofRussia, but some future "secular institution" of the Jews, obtainedby "reforming the Jewish community," so to speak, by"legislative" means, through the Duma:
But we have alreadyseen that "institutions" in themselves cannot serve as"guarantees" if the regime in the state generally is not a democraticone.
But what, it may beasked, will be - the position under a future democratic system? Will notspecial "cultural institutions which guarantee," etc., be requiredeven under democracy? What is the position in this respect in democraticSwitzerland, for example? Are there special cultural institutions inSwitzerland on the pattern of Springer's "National Council"? No,there are not. But do not the cultural interests of, for instance, theItalians, who constitute a minority there, suffer for that reason? One does notseem to hear that they do. And that is quite natural: in Switzerland allspecial cultural "institutions," which supposedly"guarantee," etc., are rendered superfluous by democracy.
And so, impotent inthe present and superfluous in the future -- such are the institutionsof cultural-national autonomy, and such is national autonomy.
But it becomes still moreharmful when it is thrust upon a "nation" whose existence and futureare open to doubt. In such cases the advocates of national autonomy are obligedto protect and preserve all the peculiar features of the "nation,"the bad as well as the good, just for the sake of "saving the nation"from assimilation, just for the sake of "preserving" it.
That the Bund shouldtake this dangerous path was inevitable. And it did take it. We are referringto the resolutions of recent conferences of the Bund on the question of the"Sabbath," "Yiddish," etc.
Social-Democracystrives to secure for all nations the right to use their own language.But that does not satisfy the Bund; it demands that "the rights of the Jewishlanguage" (our italics -- J. St.) be championed with"exceptional persistence," and the Bund itself in the elections tothe Fourth Duma declared that it would give "preference to those of them(i.e., electors) who undertake to defend the rights of the Jewishlanguage."
Not the generalright of all nations to use their own language, but the particular rightof the Jewish language, Yiddish! Let the workers of the various nationalitiesfight primarily for their own language: the Jews for Jewish, theGeorgians for Georgian, and so forth. The struggle for the general right of allnations is a secondary matter. You do not have to recognize the right of alloppressed nationalities to use their own language; but if you have recognizedthe right of Yiddish, know that the Bund will vote for you, the Bund will "prefer"you.
But in what way thendoes the Bund differ from the bourgeois nationalists?
Social-Democracystrives to secure the establishment of a compulsory weekly rest day. But thatdoes not satisfy the Bund; it demands that "by legislative means""the Jewish proletariat should be guaranteed the right to observe theirSabbath and be relieved of the obligation to observe another day. "*
It is to be expectedthat the Bund will take another "step forward" and demand the rightto observe all the ancient Hebrew holidays. And if, to the misfortune of theBund, the Jewish workers have discarded religious prejudices and do not want toobserve these holidays, the Bund with its agitation for "the right to theSabbath," will remind them of the Sabbath, it will, so to speak, cultivateamong them "the Sabbatarian spirit. "...
Quite comprehensible,therefore, are the "passionate speeches" delivered at the EighthConference of the Bund demanding "Jewish hospitals," a demand thatwas based on the argument that "a patient feels more at home among his ownpeople," that "the Jewish worker will not feel at ease among Polishworkers, but will feel at ease among Jewish shopkeepers."
Preservation ofeverything Jewish, conservation of all the national peculiarities of theJews, even those that are patently harmful to the proletariat, isolation of theJews from everything non-Jewish, even the establishment of special hospitals --that is the level to which the Bund has sunk!
Comrade Plekhanov wasright a thousand times over when he said that the Bund "is adaptingsocialism to nationalism." Of course, V. Kossovsky and Bundists like himmay denounce Plekhanov as a "demagogue" [27] [28] -- paper will putup with anything that is written on it -- but those who are familiar with theactivities of the Bund will easily realize that these brave fellows are simplyafraid to tell the truth about themselves and are hiding behind strong languageabout "demagogy. "...
But since it holdssuch a position on the national question, the Bund was naturally obliged, inthe matter of organization also, to take the path of segregating the Jewishworkers, the path of formation of national curiae within Social-Democracy. Suchis the logic of national autonomy!
And, in fact, theBund did pass from the theory of "sole representation" to the theoryof "national demarcation" of workers. The Bund demands that RussianSocial-Democracy should "in its organizational structure introducedemarcation according to nationalities." From "demarcation" itmade a "step forward" to the theory of "segregation." It isnot for nothing that speeches were made at the Eighth Conference of the Bunddeclaring that "national existence lies in segregation."
Organizationalfederalism harbours the elements of disintegration and separatism. The Bund isheading for separatism.
And, indeed, there isnothing else it can head for. Its very existence as an extra-territorialorganization drives it to separatism. The Bund does not possess a definiteintegral territory; it operates on "foreign" territories, whereas theneighbouring Polish, Lettish and Russian Social-Democracies are internationalterritorial collective bodies. But the result is that every extension of thesecollective bodies means a "loss" to the Bund and a restriction of itsfield of action. There are two alternatives: either Russian Social-Democracy asa whole must be reconstructed on the basis of national federalism -- which willenable the Bund to "secure" the Jewish proletariat for itself; or theterritorial-international principle of these collective bodies remains in force-- in which case the Bund must be reconstructed on the basis ofinternationalism, as is the case with the Polish and LettishSocial-Democracies.
This explains why theBund from the very beginning demanded "the reorganization of RussianSocial-Democracy on a federal basis." [29]
In 1906, yielding tothe pressure from below in favour of unity, the Bund chose a middle path andjoined Russian Social-Democracy. But how did it join? Whereas the Polish andLettish Social-Democracies joined for the purpose of peaceable joint action,the Bund joined for the purpose of waging war for a federation. That is exactlywhat Medem, the leader of the Bundists, said at the time:
"We are joining not for the sake of an idyll, butin order to fight. There is no idyll, and only Manilovs could hope for one inthe near future. The Bund must join the Party armed from head to foot."[30]
It would be wrong to regardthis as an expression of evil intent on Medem's part. It is not a matter ofevil intent, but of the peculiar position of the Bund, which compels it tofight Russian Social-Democracy, which is built on the basis ofinternationalism. And in fighting it the Bund naturally violated the interestsof unity. Finally, matters went so far that the Bund formally broke withRussian Social-Democracy, violating its statutes, and in the elections to theFourth Duma joining forces with the Polish nationalists against the PolishSocial-Democrats.
The Bund hasapparently found that a rupture is the best guarantee for independent activity.
And so the"principle" of organizational "demarcation" led toseparatism and to a complete rupture.
In a controversy withthe old Iskra [31] on the question of federalism, the Bund once wrote:
"Iskra wants to assure us that federalrelations between the Bund and Russian Social-Democracy are bound to weaken theties between them. We cannot refute this opinion by referring to practice inRussia, for the simple reason that Russian Social-Democracy does not exist as afederal body. But we can refer to the extremely instructive experience ofSocial-Democracy in Austria, which assumed a federal character by virtue of thedecision of the Party Congress of 1897."
That was written in 1902.
But we are now in theyear 1913. We now have both Russian "practice" and the"experience of Social-Democracy in Austria."
What do they tell us?
Let us begin with"the extremely instructive experience of Social-Democracy inAustria." Up to 1896 there was a united Social-Democratic Party inAustria. In that year the Czechs at the International Congress in London forthe first time demanded separate representation, and were given it. In 1897, atthe Vienna (Wimberg) Party Congress, the united party was formally Liquidatedand in its place a federal league of six national "Social-Democraticgroups" was set up. Subsequently these "groups" were convertedinto independent parties, which gradually severed contact with one another.Following the parties, the parliamentary group broke up -- national"clubs" were formed. Next came the trade unions, which also splitaccording to nationalities. Even the co-operative societies were affected, theCzech separatists calling upon the workers to split them up. [32] We will notdwell on the fact that separatist agitation weakens the workers' sense ofsolidarity and frequently drives them to strike-breaking.
Thus "theextremely instructive experience of Social-Democracy in Austria" speaks againstthe Bund and for the old Iskra. Federalism in the Austrian party has ledto the most outrageous separatism, to the destruction of the unity of thelabour movement.
We have seen abovethat "practical experience in Russia" also bears this out. Like theCzech separatists, the Bundist separatists have broken with the general RussianSocial-Democratic Party. As for the trade unions, the Bundist trade unions,from the outset they were organized on national lines, that is to say, theywere cut off from the workers of other nationalities.
Complete segregationand complete rupture -- that is what is revealed by the "Russian practicalexperience" of federalism.
It is not surprisingthat the effect of this state of affairs upon the workers is to weaken theirsense of solidarity and to demoralize them; and the latter process is alsopenetrating the Bund. We are referring to the increasing collisions betweenJewish and Polish workers in connection with unemployment. Here is the kind ofspeech that was made on this subject at the Ninth Conference of the Bund:
"... We regard the Polish workers, who areousting us, as pogromists, as scabs; we do not support their strikes, we breakthem. Secondly, we reply to being ousted by ousting in our turn: we reply toJewish workers not being allowed into the factories by not allowing Polishworkers near the benches.... If we do not take this matter into our ownhands the workers will follow others" (our italics -- J. St.)
That is the way they talkabout solidarity at a Bundist conference.
You cannot go furtherthan that in the way of "demarcation" and "segregation."The Bund has achieved its aim: it is carrying its demarcation between theworkers of different nationalities to the point of conflicts andstrike-breaking. And there is no other course: "If we do not take thismatter into our own hands the workers will follow others...."
Disorganization ofthe labour movement, demoralization of the Social-Democratic ranks -- that iswhat the federalism of the Bund leads to.
Thus the idea ofcultural-national autonomy, the atmosphere it creates, has proved to be evenmore harmful in Russia than in Austria.
We spoke above of the waverings of one section of theCaucasian Social-Democrats who were unable to withstand the nationalist "epidemic."These waverings were revealed in the fact that, strange as it may seem, theabove-mentioned Social-Democrats followed in the footsteps of the Bund andproclaimed cultural-national autonomy.
Regional autonomy forthe Caucasus as a whole and cultural-national autonomy for the nations formingthe Caucasus -- that is the way these Social-Democrats, who, incidentally, arelinked with the Russian Liquidators, formulate their demand.
Listen to theiracknowledged leader, the not unknown N.
"Everybody knows that the Caucasus differsprofoundly from the central gubernias, both as regards the racial compositionof its population and as regards its territory and agricultural development.The exploitation and material development of such a region require localworkers acquainted with local peculiarities and accustomed to the local climateand culture. All laws designed to further the exploitation of the localterritory should be issued locally and put into effect by local forces.Consequently, the jurisdiction of the central organ of Caucasianself-government should extend to legislation on local questions.... Hence, thefunctions of the Caucasian centre should consist in the passing of lawsdesigned to further the economic exploitation of the local territory and thematerial prosperity of the region." [33]
Thus -- regional autonomyfor the Caucasus.
If we abstractourselves from the rather confused and incoherent arguments of N., itmust be admitted that his conclusion is correct. Regional autonomy for theCaucasus, within the framework of a general state constitution, which N.does not deny, is indeed essential because of the peculiarities of itscomposition and its conditions of life. This was also acknowledged by theRussian Social-Democratic Party, which at its Second Congress proclaimed"regional self-government for those border regions which in respect oftheir conditions of life and the composition of their population differ fromthe regions of Russia proper."
When Martov submittedthis point for discussion at the Second Congress, he justified it on thegrounds that "the vast extent of Russia and the experience of ourcentralized administration point to the necessity and expediency of regionalself-government for such large units as Finland, Poland, Lithuania and theCaucasus."
But it follows thatregional self-government is to be interpreted as regional autonomy.
But N. goesfurther. According to him, regional autonomy for the Caucasus covers "onlyone aspect of the question."
"So far we have spoken only of the materialdevelopment of local life. But the economic development of a region isfacilitated not only by economic activity but also by spiritual, culturalactivity."... "A culturally strong nation is strong also in theeconomic sphere. "... "But the cultural development of nations ispossible only in the national languages."... "Consequently, allquestions connected with the native language are questions of national culture.Such are the questions of education! the judicature, the church, literature,art, science, the theatre, etc. If the material development of a region unitesnations, matters of national culture disunite them and place each in a separatesphere. Activities of the former kind are associated with a definiteterritory."... "This is not the case with matters of nationalculture. These are associated not with a definite territory but with theexistence of a definite nation. The fate of the Georgian language interests aGeorgian, no matter where he lives. It would be a sign of profound ignorance tosay that Georgian culture concerns only the Georgians who live in Georgia.Take, for instance, the Armenian church. Armenians of various localities andstates take part in the administration of its affairs. Territory plays no parthere. Or, for instance, the creation of a Georgian museum interests not onlythe Georgians of Tiflis, but also the Georgians of Baku, Kutais, St.Petersburg, etc. Hence, the administration and control of all affairs ofnational culture must be left to the nations concerned. we proclaim in favourof cultural-national autonomy for the Caucasian nationalities." [34]
In short, since culture isnot territory, and territory is not culture, cultural-national autonomy isrequired. That is all N. can say in the latter's favour.
We shall not stop todiscuss again national-cultural autonomy in general; we have already spoken ofits objectionable character. We should like to point out only that, while beingunsuitable in general, cultural-national autonomy is also meaningless andnonsensical in relation to Caucasian conditions.
And for the followingreason:
Cultural-nationalautonomy presumes more or less developed nationalities, with a developedculture and literature. Failing these conditions, autonomy loses all sense andbecomes an absurdity. But in the Caucasus there are a number of nationalitieseach possessing a primitive culture, a separate language, but without its ownliterature; nationalities, moreover, which are in a state of transition, partlybecoming assimilated and partly continuing to develop. How is cultural-nationalautonomy to be applied to them? What is to be done with such nationalities? Howare they to be "organized" into separate cultural-national unions, asis undoubtedly implied by cultural-national autonomy?
What is to be donewith the Mingrelians, the Abkhasians, the Adjarians, the Svanetians, theLesghians, and so on, who speak different languages but do not possess aliterature of their own? To what nations are they to be attached? Can they be "organized"into national unions? Around what "cultural affairs" are they to be"organized"?
What is to be donewith the Ossetians, of whom the Transcaucasian Ossetians are becomingassimilated (but are as yet by no means wholly assimilated) by the Georgians,while the Cis-Caucasian Ossetians are partly being assimilated by the Russiansand partly continuing to develop and are creating their own literature? How arethey to be "organized" into a single national union?
To what nationalunion should one attach the Adjarians, who speak the Georgian language, butwhose culture is Turkish and who profess the religion of Islam? Shall they be"organized" separately from the Georgians with regard to religiousaffairs and together with the Georgians with regard to other culturalaffairs? And what about the Kobuletians, the Ingushes, the Inghilois?
What kind of autonomyis that which excludes a whole number of nationalities from the list?
No, that is not asolution of the national question, but the fruit of idle fancy.
But let us grant theimpossible and assume that our N.'s national-cultural autonomy has beenput into effect. Where would it lead to, what would be its results? Take, forinstance, the Transcaucasian Tatars, with their minimum percentage ofliterates, their schools controlled by the omnipotent mullahs and their culturepermeated by the religious spirit.... It is not difficult to understand that to"organize" them into a cultural national union would mean to placethem under the control of the mullahs, to deliver them over to the tendermercies of the reactionary mullahs, to create a new stronghold of spiritualenslavement of the Tatar masses to their worst enemy.
But since when haveSocial-Democrats made it a practice to bring grist to the mill of the reactionaries?
Could the CaucasianLiquidators really find nothing better to "proclaim" than theisolation of the Transcaucasian Tatars within a cultural-national union whichwould place the masses under the thraldom of vicious reactionaries?
No, that is nosolution of the national question.
The national questionin the Caucasus can be solved only by drawing the belated nations andnationalities into the common stream of a higher culture. It is the onlyprogressive solution and the only solution acceptable to Social-Democracy.Regional autonomy in the Caucasus is acceptable because it would draw thebelated nations into the common cultural development; it would help them tocast off the shell of small nation insularity; it would impel them forward andfacilitate access to the benefits of higher culture. Cultural-nationalautonomy, however, acts in a diametrically opposite direction, because it shutsup the nations within their old shells, binds them to the lower stages ofcultural development and prevents them from rising to the higher stages ofculture.
In this way nationalautonomy counteracts the beneficial aspects of regional autonomy and nullifiesit.
That is why the mixedtype of autonomy which combines national-cultural autonomy and regionalautonomy as proposed by N. is also unsuitable. This unnaturalcombination does not improve matters but makes them worse, because in additionto retarding the development of the belated nations it transforms regionalautonomy into an arena of conflict between the nations organized in thenational unions.
Thuscultural-national autonomy, which is unsuitable generally, would be asenseless, reactionary undertaking in the Caucasus.
So much for thecultural-national autonomy of N. and his Caucasian fellow-thinkers.
Whether the CaucasianLiquidators will take "a step forward" and follow in the footsteps ofthe Bund on the question of organization also, the future will show. So far, inthe history of Social-Democracy federalism in organization always precedednational autonomy in programme. The Austrian Social-Democrats introducedorganizational federalism as far back as 1897, and it was only two years later(1899) that they adopted national autonomy. The Bundists spoke distinctly ofnational autonomy for the first time in 1901, whereas organizational federalismhad been practiced by them since 1897.
The CaucasianLiquidators have begun from the end, from national autonomy. If they continueto follow in the footsteps of the Bund they will first have to demolish thewhole existing organizational edifice, which was erected at the end of the'nineties on the basis of internationalism.
But, easy though itwas to adopt national autonomy, which is still not understood by the workers,it will be difficult to demolish an edifice which it has taken years to buildand which has been raised and cherished by the workers of all the nationalitiesof the Caucasus. This Herostratian undertaking has only to be begun and theeyes of the workers will be opened to the nationalist character ofcultural-national autonomy.
While the Caucasians are settling the national questionin the usual manner, by means of verbal and written discussion, the All-RussianConference of the Liquidators has invented a most unusual method. It is asimple and easy method. Listen to this:
"Having heard the communication of the Caucasiandelegation to the effect that... it is necessary to demand national-culturalautonomy, this conference, while expressing no opinion on the merits of thisdemand, declares that such an interpretation of the clause of the programmewhich recognizes the right of every nationality to self-determination does notcontradict the precise meaning of the programme."
Thus, first of all they"express no opinion on the merits" of the question, and then they"declare." An original method....
And what does thisoriginal conference "declare"?
That the"demand" for national-cultural autonomy "does not contradict theprecise meaning "of the programme, which recognizes the right of nations toself-determination.
Let us examine thisproposition.
The clause onself-determination speaks of the rights of nations. According to this clause,nations have the right not only of autonomy but also of secession. It is aquestion of political self-determination. Whom did the Liquidators wantto fool when they endeavoured to misinterpret this right of nations topolitical self-determination, which has long been recognized by the whole ofinternational Social-Democracy?
Or perhaps theLiquidators will try to wriggle out of the situation and defend themselves bythe sophism that cultural-national autonomy "does not contradict" therights of nations? That is to say, if all the nations in a given state agree toarrange their affairs on the basis of cultural-national autonomy, they, thegiven sum of nations, are fully entitled to do so and nobody may forciblyimpose a different form of political life on them. This is both new andclever. Should it not be added that, speaking generally, a nation has the rightto abolish its own constitution, replace it by a system of tyranny and revertto the old order on the grounds that the nation, and the nation alone, has theright to determine its own destiny? We repeat: in this sense, neithercultural-national autonomy nor any other kind of nationalist reaction"contradicts" the rights of nations.
Is that what theesteemed conference wanted to say?
No, not that. Itspecifically says that cultural-national autonomy "does notcontradict," not the rights of nations, but "the precisemeaning" of the programme. The point here is the programme and not therights of nations.
And that is quiteunderstandable. If it were some nation that addressed itself to the conferenceof Liquidators, the conference might have directly declared that the nation hasa right to cultural-national autonomy. But it was not a nation that addresseditself to the conference, but a "delegation" of CaucasianSocial-Democrats -- bad Social-Democrats, it is true, but Social-Democratsnevertheless. And they inquired not about the rights of nations, but whethercultural-national autonomy contradicted the principles of Social-Democracy,whether it did not "contradict" "the precise meaning" ofthe programme of Social-Democracy.
Thus, the rightsof nations and "the precise meaning" of the programme ofSocial-Democracy are not one and the same thing.
Evidently, there aredemands which, while they do not contradict the rights of nations, may yetcontradict "the precise meaning" of the programme.
For example. The programmeof the Social-Democrats contains a clause on freedom of religion. According tothis clause any group of persons have the right to profess any religionthey please: Catholicism, the religion of the Orthodox Church, etc.Social-Democrats will combat all forms of religious persecution, be it ofmembers of the Orthodox Church, Catholics or Protestants. Does this mean thatCatholicism, Protestantism, etc., "do not contradict the precisemeaning" of the programme? No, it does not. Social-Democrats will alwaysprotest against persecution of Catholicism or Protestantism; they will alwaysdefend the right of nations to profess any religion they please; but at thesame time, on the basis of a correct understanding of the interests of theproletariat, they will carry on agitation against Catholicism, Protestantismand the religion of the Orthodox Church in order to achieve the triumph of thesocialist world outlook.
And they will do sojust because there is no doubt that Protestantism, Catholicism, the religion ofthe Orthodox Church, etc., "contradict the precise meaning" of theprogramme, i.e., the correctly understood interests of the proletariat.
The same must be saidof self-determination. Nations have a right to arrange their affairs as theyplease; they have a right to preserve any of their national institutions,whether beneficial or harmful -- nobody can (nobody has a right to!) forciblyinterfere in the life of a nation. But that does not mean that Social-Democracywill not combat and agitate against the harmful institutions of nations andagainst the inexpedient demands of nations. On the contrary, it is the duty ofSocial-Democracy to conduct such agitation and to endeavour to influence thewill of nations so that the nations may arrange their affairs in the way thatwill best correspond to the interests of the proletariat. For this reasonSocial-Democracy, while fighting for the right of nations toself-determination, will at the same time agitate, for instance, against thesecession of the Tatars, or against cultural-national autonomy for theCaucasian nations; for both, while not contradicting the rights of thesenations, do contradict "the precise meaning" of the programme,i.e., the interests of the Caucasian proletariat.
Obviously, "therights of nations" and the "precise meaning" of the programmeare on two entirely different planes. Whereas the "precise meaning"of the programme expresses the interests of the proletariat, as scientificallyformulated in the programme of the latter, the rights of nations may expressthe interests of any class -- bourgeoisie, aristocracy, clergy, etc. --depending on the strength and influence of these classes. On the one hand arethe duties of Marxists, on the other the rights of nations, whichconsist of various classes. The rights of nations and the principles ofSocial-Democracy may or may not "contradict" each other, just as,say, the pyramid of Cheops may or may not contradict the famous conference ofthe Liquidators. They are simply not comparable.
But it follows thatthe esteemed conference most unpardonably muddled two entirely differentthings. The result obtained was not a solution of the national question but anabsurdity, according to which the rights of nations and the principles ofSocial-Democracy "do not contradict" each other, and, consequently;every demand of a nation may be made compatible with the interests of theproletariat; consequently, no demand of a nation which is striving forself-determination will "contradict the precise meaning" of theprogramme!
They pay no heed tologic....
It was this absurditythat gave rise to the now famous resolution of the conference of theLiquidators which declares that the demand for national-cultural autonomy"does not contradict the precise meaning" of the programme.
But it was not onlythe laws of logic that were violated by the conference of the Liquidators.
By sanctioningcultural-national autonomy it also violated its duty to RussianSocial-Democracy. It most definitely did violate "the precise meaning"of the programme, for it is well known that the Second Congress, which adoptedthe programme, emphatically repudiated cultural-national autonomy. Hereis what was said at the congress in this connection:
"Goldblatt (Bundist): ...1 deem it necessary that specialinstitutions be set up to protect the freedom of cultural development ofnationalities, and I therefore propose that the following words be added to §8: 'and the creation of institutions which will guarantee them completefreedom of cultural development.'" (This, as we know, is the Bund'sdefinition of cultural-national autonomy. -- J. St.)
"Martynov pointed out that generalinstitutions must be so constituted as to protect particular interests also. Itis impossible to create a special institution to guarantee freedom forcultural development of the nationalities.
"Yegorov: On the question ofnationality we can adopt only negative proposals, i.e., we are opposed to allrestrictions upon nationality. But we, as Social-Democrats, are not concernedwith whether any particular nationality will develop as such. That is aspontaneous process.
"Koltsov: The delegates from theBund are always offended when their nationalism is referred to. Yet theamendment proposed by the delegate from the Bund is of a purely nationalistcharacter. We are asked to take purely offensive measures in order to supporteven nationalities that are dying out."
In the end "Goldblatt's amendment wasrejected by the majority, only three votes being cast for it."
Thus it is clear that theconference of the Liquidators did "contradict the precise meaning" ofthe programme. It violated the programme.
The Liquidators arenow trying to justify themselves by referring to the Stockholm Congress, whichthey allege sanctioned cultural-national autonomy. Thus, V. Kossovsky writes:
"As we know, according to the agreement adoptedby the Stockholm Congress, the Bund was allowed to preserve its nationalprogramme (pending a decision on the national question by a general Partycongress). This congress recorded that national-cultural autonomy at any ratedoes not contradict the general Party programme." [35]
But the efforts of theLiquidators are in vain. The Stockholm Congress never thought of sanctioningthe programme of the Bund -- it merely agreed to leave the question open forthe time being. The brave Kossovsky did not have enough courage to tell thewhole truth. But the facts speak for themselves. Here they are:
"An amendment was moved by Galin: 'The questionof the national programme is left open in view of the fact that it is notbeing examined by the congress.' (For -- 50 votes, against --32.)
"Voice: What does that mean -- open?
"Chairman: When we say that thenational question is left open, it means that the Bund may maintain itsdecision on this question until the next congress" [36] (our italics. -- J.St.).
As you see, the congresseven did "not examine" the question of the national programme of theBund -- it simply left it "open," leaving the Bund itself to decide thefate of its programme until the next general congress met. In other words, theStockholm Congress avoided the question, expressing no opinion oncultural-national autonomy one way or another.
The conference of theLiquidators, however, most definitely undertakes to give an opinion on thematter, declares cultural-national autonomy to be acceptable, and endorses itin the name of the Party programme.
The difference isonly too evident.
Thus, in spite of allits artifices, the conference of the Liquidators did not advance the nationalquestion a single step.
All it could do wasto squirm before the Bund and the Caucasian national-Liquidators.
It remains for us to suggest a positive solution of thenational question.
We take as ourstarting point that the question can be solved only in intimate connection withthe present situation in Russia.
Russia is in atransitional period, when "normal," "constitutional" lifehas not yet been established and when the political crisis has not yet beensettled. Days of storm and "complications" are ahead. And this givesrise to the movement, the present and the future movement, the aim of which isto achieve complete democratization.
It is in connectionwith this movement that the national question must be examined.
Thus the completedemocratization of the country is the basis and condition for thesolution of the national question.
When seeking asolution of the question we must take into account not only the situation athome but also the situation abroad. Russia is situated between Europe and Asia,between Austria and China. The growth of democracy in Asia is inevitable. Thegrowth of imperialism in Europe is not fortuitous. In Europe, capital isbeginning to feel cramped, and it is reaching out towards foreign countries insearch of new markets, cheap labour and new fields of investment. But thisleads to external complications and to war. No one can assert that the BalkanWar [37] is the end and not the beginning of the complications. It is quitepossible, therefore, that a combination of internal and external conditions mayarise in which one or another nationality in Russia may find it necessary toraise and settle the question of its independence. And, of course, it is notfor Marxists to create obstacles in such cases.
But it follows thatRussian Marxists cannot dispense with the right of nations toself-determination.
Thus, the right ofself-determination is an essential element in the solution of the nationalquestion.
Further. What must beour attitude towards nations which for one reason or another will prefer toremain within the framework of the whole?
We have seen thatcultural-national autonomy is unsuitable. Firstly, it is artificial andimpracticable, for it proposes artificially to draw into a single nation peoplewhom the march of events, real events, is disuniting and dispersing to everycorner of the country. Secondly, it stimulates nationalism, because it leads tothe viewpoint in favour of the "demarcation" of people according tonational curiae, the "organization" of nations, the"preservation" and cultivation of "national peculiarities"-- all of which are entirely incompatible with Social-Democracy. It is notfortuitous that the Moravian separatists in the Reichsrat, having severedthemselves from the German Social-Democratic deputies, have united with theMoravian bourgeois deputies to form a single, so to speak, Moravian"kolo." Nor is it fortuitous that the separatists of the Bund havegot themselves involved in nationalism by acclaiming the "Sabbath"and "Yiddish." There are no Bundist deputies yet in the Duma, but inthe Bund area there is a clerical-reactionary Jewish community, in the"controlling institutions" of which the Bund is arranging, for abeginning, a "get-together" of the Jewish workers and bourgeois. Suchis the logic of cultural-national autonomy.
Thus, nationalautonomy does not solve the problem.
What, then, is theway out?
The only correctsolution is regional autonomy, autonomy for such crystallized units asPoland, Lithuania, the Ukraine, the Caucasus, etc.
The advantage ofregional autonomy consists, first of all, in the fact that it does not dealwith a fiction bereft of territory, but with a definite population inhabiting adefinite territory. Next, it does not divide people according to nations, itdoes not strengthen national barriers; on the contrary, it breaks down thesebarriers and unites the population in such a manner as to open the way fordivision of a different kind, division according to classes. Finally; it makesit possible to utilize the natural wealth of the region and to develop itsproductive forces in the best possible way without awaiting the decisions of acommon centre -- functions which are not inherent features of cultural-nationalautonomy.
Thus, regionalautonomy is an essential element in the solution of the national question.
Of course, not one ofthe regions constitutes a compact, homogeneous nation, for each is interspersedwith national minorities. Such are the Jews in Poland, the Letts in Lithuania,the Russians in the Caucasus, the Poles in the Ukraine, and so on. It may befeared, therefore, that the minorities will be oppressed by the nationalmajorities. But there will be grounds for fear only if the old order continuesto prevail in the country. Give the country complete democracy and all groundsfor fear will vanish.
It is proposed tobind the dispersed minorities into a single national union. But what theminorities want is not an artificial union, but real rights in the localitiesthey inhabit. What can such a union give them without completedemocratization? On the other hand, what need is there for a national union whenthere is complete democratization?
What is it thatparticularly agitates a national minority?
A minority isdiscontented not because there is no national union but because it does notenjoy the right to use its native language. Permit it to use its nativelanguage and the discontent will pass of itself.
A minority is discontentednot because there is no artificial union but because it does not possess itsown schools. Give it its own schools and all grounds for discontent willdisappear.
A minority isdiscontented not because there is no national union, but because it does notenjoy liberty of conscience (religious liberty), liberty of movement, etc. Giveit these liberties and it will cease to be discontented.
Thus, equal rightsof nations in all forms (language, schools, etc.) is an essential elementin the solution of the national question. Consequently, a state law based oncomplete democratization of the country is required, prohibiting all nationalprivileges without exception and every kind of disability or restriction on therights of national minorities.
That, and that alone,is the real, not a paper guarantee of the rights of a minority.
One may or may notdispute the existence of a logical connection between organizational federalismand cultural-national autonomy. But one cannot dispute the fact that the lattercreates an atmosphere favouring unlimited federalism, developing into completerupture, into separatism. If the Czechs in Austria and the Bundists in Russiabegan with autonomy, passed to federation and ended in separatism, there can beno doubt that an important part in this was played by the nationalistatmosphere that is naturally generated by cultural-national autonomy. It is notfortuitous that national autonomy and organizational federalism go hand inhand. It is quite. understandable. Both demand demarcation according tonationalities. Both presume organization according to nationalities. Thesimilarity is beyond question. The only difference is that in one case thepopulation as a whole is divided, while in the other it is theSocial-Democratic workers who are divided.
We know where thedemarcation of workers according to nationalities leads to. The disintegrationof a united workers' party, the splitting of trade unions according tonationalities, aggravation of national friction, national strikebreaking,complete demoralization within the ranks of Social-Democracy -- such are theresults of organizational federalism. This is eloquently borne out by thehistory of Social-Democracy in Austria and the activities of the Bund inRussia.
The only cure for'this is organization on the basis of internationalism.
To unite locally theworkers of all nationalities of Russia into single, integral collectivebodies, to unite these collective bodies into a single party -- such isthe task.
It goes without sayingthat a party structure of this kind does not preclude, but on the contrarypresumes, wide autonomy for the regions within the single integralparty.
The experience of theCaucasus proves the expediency of this type of organization. If the Caucasianshave succeeded in overcoming the national friction between the Armenian andTatar workers; if they have succeeded in safeguarding the population againstthe possibility of massacres and shooting affrays; if in Baku, thatkaleidoscope of national groups, national conflicts are now no longer possible,and if it has been possible to draw the workers there into the single currentof a powerful movement, then the international structure of the CaucasianSocial-Democracy was not the least factor in bringing this about.
The type oforganization influences not only practical work. It stamps an indelible impresson the whole mental life of the worker. The worker lives the life of hisorganization, which stimulates his intellectual growth and educates him. Andthus, acting within his organization and continually meeting there comradesfrom other nationalities, and side by side with them waging a common struggleunder the leadership of a common collective body, he becomes deeply imbued withthe idea that workers are primarily members of one class family, membersof the united army of socialism. And this cannot but have a tremendouseducational value for large sections of the working class.
Therefore, theinternational type of organization serves as a school of fraternal sentimentsand is a tremendous agitational factor on behalf of internationalism.
But this is not thecase with an organization on the basis of nationalities. When the workers areorganized according to nationality they isolate themselves within their nationalshells, fenced off from each other by organizational barriers. The stress islaid not on what is common to the workers but on what distinguishes themfrom each other. In this type of organization the worker is primarily amember of his nation: a Jew, a Pole, and so on. It is not surprising that nationalfederalism in organization inculcates in the workers a spirit of nationalseclusion.
Therefore, thenational type of organization is a school of national narrow-mindedness andstagnation.
Thus we areconfronted by two fundamentally different types of organization: thetype based on international solidarity and the type based on the organizational"demarcation" of the workers according to nationalities.
Attempts to reconcilethese two types have so far been vain. The compromise rules of the AustrianSocial-Democratic Party drawn up in Wimberg in 1897 were left hanging in theair. The Austrian party fell to pieces and dragged the trade unions with it."Compromise" proved to be not only utopian, but harmful. Strasser isright when he says that "separatism achieved its first triumph at theWimberg Party Congress." [38] The same is true in Russia. The"compromise" with the federalism of the Bund which took place at theStockholm Congress ended in a complete fiasco. The Bund violated the Stockholmcompromise. Ever since the Stockholm Congress the Bund has been an obstacle inthe way of union of the workers locally in a single organization, whichwould include workers of all nationalities. And the Bund has obstinatelypersisted in its separatist tactics in spite of the fact that in 1907 and in1908 Russian Social-Democracy repeatedly demanded that unity should at last beestablished. from below among the workers of all nationalities. [39] The Bund,which began with organizational national autonomy, in fact passed tofederalism, only to end in complete rupture, separatism. And by breaking withthe Russian Social-Democratic Party it caused disharmony and disorganization inthe ranks of the latter. Let us recall the Jagiello affair, [40] for instance.
The path of"compromise" must therefore be discarded as utopian and harmful.
One thing or theother: either the federalism of the Bund, in which case the RussianSocial-Democratic Party must re-form itself on a basis of"demarcation" of the workers according to nationalities; or aninternational type of organization, in which case the Bund must reform itselfon a basis of territorial autonomy after the pattern of the Caucasian, Lettishand Polish Social-Democracies, and thus make possible the direct union of theJewish workers with the workers of the other nationalities of Russia.
There is no middlecourse: principles triumph, they do not "compromise."
Thus, theprinciple of international solidarity of the workers is an essential elementin the solution of the national question.
Vienna,
January 1913
K. Stalin
[1]
[2] See"Report of the Ninth Conference of the Bund."
[3] See"Announcement of the August Conference."
[4] See"Announcement of the August Conference."
[5] See R.Springer, The National Problem, Obshchestvennaya Polza Publishing House,1909, p. 43.
[6] See O.Bauer, The National Question and Social-Democracy, Serp PublishingHouse, 1909.
[9] See V.Kossovsky, Problems of Nationality, 1907.
[10] The BrünnParteitag, or Congress, of the Austrian Social-Democratic Party was held onSeptember 24-29, 1899. The resolution on the national question adopted by thiscongress is quoted by J. V. Stalin in the chapter IV, "Cultural-NationalAutonomy."
[11] SeeSpringer, The National Problem.
[12] SeeBauer, The National Question and Social-Democracy.
[13]"Thank God we have no parliament here" -- the words uttered by V.Kokovtsev, tsarist Minister of Finance (later Prime Minister), in the StateDuma on April 24 1908.
[14] Therepresentatives of the South-Slav Social-Democratic Party also voted for it. SeeDiscussion of the National Question at the Brünn Congress, 1906.
[15] In M.Panin's Russian translation (see his translation of Bauer's book),"national individualities" is given in place of "nationalpeculiarities." Panin translated this passage incorrectly. The word"individuality" is not in the German text, which speaks of nationalenEigenart, i.e., peculiarities, which is far from being the samething.
[18] SeeChapter II of the Manifesto of the Communist Party by Karl Marx andFrederick Engels.
[19] TheVienna Congress (or Wimberg Congress -- after the name of the hotel inwhich it met) of the Austrian Social-Democratic Party was held June 6-12 1897.
[20] See K.Marx, "The Jewish Question," 1906.
[21] Thereference is to an article by Karl Marx entitled "Zur Judenfrage"("The Jewish Question"), published in 1844 in the Deutsch-FranzösischeJahrbücher.
[22]
[23] See Formsof the National Movement, etc., edited by Kastelyansky.
[24] See Minutesof the Second Congress.
[25] TheEighth Congress of the Bund was held in September 1910 in Lvov.
[26] Reportof the Eighth Conference of the Bund, 1911, p. 62.
[27] See NashaZarya, No. 9-10, 1912, p. 120.
[28] In anarticle entitled "Another Splitters' Conference," published in thenewspaper Za Partiyu, October 2 (15) 1912, G. V. Plekhanov condemned the"August" Conference of the Liquidators and described the stand of theBundists and Caucasian Social-Democrats as an adaptation of socialism tonationalism. Kossovsky, leader of the Bundists, criticized Plekhanov in aletter to the Liquidators' magazine Nasha Zarya.
[29] See ConcerningNational Autonomy and the Reorganizatzon of Russian Social-Democracy on aFederal Basis, 1902, published by the Bund.
[31]
[32]
[33] See theGeorgian newspaper Chveni Tskhovreba (Our Life), No. 12, 1912. ChveniTskhovreba was a daily paper published by the Georgian Mensheviks in Kutaisfrom July 1 to 22 1912.
[34] See theGeorgian newspaper Chveni Tskhovreba, No. 12, 1912.
[36]
[37] Thereference is to the first Balkan War, which broke out in October 1912 betweenBulgaria, Serbia, Greece and Montenegro on the one hand, and Turkey on theother.
[40] E. J.Jagiello -- A member of the Polish Socialist Party (P.P.S.) was elected to theFourth State Duma for Warsaw as a result of a bloc formed by the Bund, thePolish Socialist Party and the bourgeois nationalists against the PolishSocial-Democrats. By a vote of the seven Menshevik Liquidators against the sixBolsheviks, the Social-Democratic group in the Duma adopted a resolution thatJagiello be accepted as a member of the group.