THE DRED SCOTT CASE
[What follows is
the pleadings from the original case as well as the court opinion as written by
Chief Justice Roger Brook Taney. Notes on the Missouri Compromise are included for
clarity.]
Dred Scott, Plaintiff in error, v. John F. A. Sandford.
Supreme Court of
the United States
60 U.S. 393; 15 L.
Ed. 691
December, 1856
Term
It was an action of trespass vi et armis instituted in the Circuit Court by
Scott against Sandford. Prior to the institution of the present suit, an action
was brought by Scott for his freedom in the Circuit Court of St. Louis county,
(State court,) where there was a verdict and judgment in his favor. On a writ
of error to the Supreme Court of the State, the judgment below was reversed,
and the case remanded to the Circuit Court, where it was continued to await the
decision of the case now in question.
The declaration of
Scott contained three counts: one, that Sandford had assaulted the plaintiff;
one, that he had assaulted Harriet Scott, his wife; and one, that he had
assaulted Eliza Scott and Lizzie Scott, his children.
Sandford appeared,
and filed the following plea:
DRED SCOTT v. JOHN F. A. SANDFORD.
Plea to the
Jurisdiction of the Court.
APRIL TERM, 1854.
And the said John F. A. Sandford, in his own proper person, comes and says that
this court ought not to have or take further cognizance of the action
aforesaid, because he says that said cause of action, and each and every one of
them, (if any such have accrued to the said Dred Scott,) accrued to the said
Dred Scott out of the jurisdiction of this court, and exclusively within the
jurisdiction of the courts of the State of Missouri, for that, to wit: the said
plaintiff, Dred Scott, is not a citizen of the State of Missouri, as alleged in
his declaration, because he is a negro of African descent; his ancestors were
of pure African blood, and were brought into this country and sold as negro
slaves, and this the said Sandford is ready to verify. Wherefore, he prays
judgment whether this court can or will take further cognizance of the action
aforesaid.
JOHN F. A.
SANDFORD.
To this plea there was a demurrer in the usual form, which was argued in April,
1854, when the court gave judgment that the demurrer should be sustained.
In May, 1854, the
defendant, in pursuance of an agreement between counsel, and with the leave of
the court, pleaded in bar of the action:
Not guilty.
That the plaintiff was a negro slave, the lawful property of the defendant,
and, as such, the defendant gently laid his hands upon him, and thereby had
only restrained him, as the defendant had a right to do.
That with respect
to the wife and daughters of the plaintiff, in the second and third counts of
the declaration mentioned, the defendant had, as to them, only acted in the
same manner, and in virtue of the same legal right.
In the first of
these pleas, the plaintiff joined issue; and to the second and third filed
replications alleging that the defendant, of his own wrong and without the
cause in his second and third pleas alleged, committed the trespasses.
The counsel then filed the following agreed statement of facts, viz:
In the year 1834,
the plaintiff was a negro slave belonging to Dr. Emerson, who was a surgeon in
the army of the United States. In that year, 1834, said Dr. Emerson took the
plaintiff from the State of Missouri to the military post at Rock Island, in
the State of Illinois, and held him there as a slave until the month of April
or May, 1836. At the time last mentioned, said Dr. Emerson removed the
plaintiff from said military post at Rock Island to the military post at Fort
Snelling, situate on the west bank of the Mississippi river, in the Territory
known as Upper Louisiana, acquired by the United States of France, and situate
north of the latitude of thirty-six degrees thirty minutes north, and north of
the State of Missouri. Said Dr. Emerson held the plaintiff in a slavery at said
Fort Snelling, from said last-mentioned date until the year 1838.
In the year 1835,
Harriet, who is named in the second count of the plaintiff's declaration, was
the negro slave of Major Taliaferro, who belonged to the army of the United
States. In that year, 1835, said Major Taliaferro took said Harriet to said
Fort Snelling, a military post, situated as hereinbefore stated, and kept her
there as a slave until the year 1836, and then sold and delivered her as a
slave at said Fort Snelling unto the said Dr. Emerson hereinbefore named. Said
Dr. Emerson held said Harriet in slavery at said Fort Snelling until the year
1838.
In the year 1836,
the plaintiff and said Harriet at said Fort Snelling, with the consent of said
Dr. Emerson, who then claimed to be their master and owner, intermarried, and
took each other for husband and wife. Eliza and Lizzie, named in the third
count of the plaintiff's declaration, are the fruit of that marriage. Eliza is
about fourteen years old, and was born on board the steamboat Gipsey, north of
the north line of the State of Missouri, and upon the river Mississippi. Lizzie
is about seven years old, and was born in the State of Missouri, at the
military post called Jefferson Barracks.
In the year 1838,
said Dr. Emerson removed the plaintiff and said Harriet and their said daughter
Eliza, from said Fort Snelling to the State of Missouri, where they have ever
since resided.
Before the
commencement of this suit, said Dr. Emerson sold and conveyed the plaintiff,
said Harriet, Eliza, and Lizzie, to the defendant, as slaves, and the defendant
has ever since claimed to hold them and each of them as slaves. At the times
mentioned in the Plaintiff's declaration, the defendant, claiming to be owner
as aforesaid, laid his hands upon said plaintiff, Harriet, Eliza, and Lizzie,
and imprisoned them, doing in this respect, however, no more than what he might
lawfully do if they were of right his slaves at such times.
Further proof may be given on the trial for either party.
It is agreed that
Dred Scott brought suit for his freedom in the Circuit Court of St. Louis
county; that there was a verdict and judgment in his favor; that on a writ of
error to the Supreme Court, the judgment below was reversed, and the same
remanded to the Circuit Court, where it has been continued to await the
decision of this case.
In May, 1854, the
cause went before a jury, who found the following verdict, viz: "As to the
first issue joined in this case, we of the jury find the defendant not guilty;
and as to the issue secondly above joined, we of the jury find that before and
at the time when, &c., in the first count mentioned, the said Dred Scott
was a negro slave, the lawful property of the defendant; and as to the issue
thirdly above joined, we, the jury, find that before and at the time when,
&c., in the second and third counts mentioned, the said Harriet, wife of
said Dred Scott, and Eliza and Lizzie, the daughters of the said Dred Scott,
were negro slaves, the lawful property of the defendant."
Whereupon, the
court gave judgment for the defendant. After an ineffectual motion for a new
trial, the plaintiff filed the following bill of exceptions.
On the trial of
this cause by the jury, the plaintiff, to maintain the issues on his part, read
to the jury the following agreed statement of facts, (see agreement above.) No
further testimony was given to the jury by either party. Thereupon the
plaintiff moved the court to give to the jury the following instruction, viz:
"That, upon
the facts agreed to by the parties, they ought to find for the plaintiff. The
court refused to give such instruction to the jury, and the plaintiff, to such
refusal, then and there duly excepted."
The court then
gave the following instruction to the jury, on motion of the defendant:
"The jury are
instructed, that upon the facts in this case, the law is with the
defendant." The plaintiff excepted to this instruction.
Upon these
exceptions, the case came up to this court.
It was argued at
December term, 1855, and ordered to be reargued at the present term.
The Verdict
The verdict was
that Scott, or any slave, was not free by virtue of residence in a free state
or territory, and since Scott was living in Missouri, his status must
ultimately be determined in a court there. The verdict also stated that Negroes
were not "citizens" as stated in the Constitution, and did not have
the right to sue in any federal court. When it was decided that the Missouri
Compromise was unconstitutional, it was on the grounds that slaves were
property, and prohibiting slavery in free territories would violate a slave
owner's right to own property.
The Opinion
The question is
simply this: Can a negro, whose ancestors were imported into this country and
sold as slaves, become a member of the political community formed and brought
into existence by the constitution of these United States and as such become
entitled to all the rights, and privileges, immunities, guaranteed by that
instrument to the citizen? . . .
The words
"people of the United States" and "citizens" are synonymous
terms, and mean the same thing. They both describe political body who,
according to our republican institutions, form the sovereignty, and who hold
the power and conduct the government through their representatives. They are
what we familiarly call the "sovereign people, and every citizen is one of
this people, and a constituent member of this sovereignty. The question before
us is, whether the class of persons described in the plea in abatement compose
a portion of this people, and are constituent members of this sovereignty? We
think they are not, and that they are not included, and were not intended to be
included, under the word "citizens" in the constitution, and can
therefore claim none of the rights and privileges which that instrument
provides for and secures to citizens of the United States. On the contrary,
they were at that time considered as a subordinate and inferior class of
beings, who had been subjugated by the dominant race, and, whether emancipated
or not, yet remained subject to their authority, and had no rights or privileges..................
It is not the
province of the court to decide upon the justice or injustice, the policy or
impolicy, of these laws. The decision Of that question belonged to the
political or law-making power; to those who formed the sovereignty and framed
the constitution. The duty of the court is, to interpret the instrument they
have framed, with the best lights we can obtain on the subject, and to
administer it as we find it, according to its true intent and meaning when it
was adopted
In discussing this
question, we must not confound the rights of citizenship which a State may
confer within its own limits, and and the rights of citizenship as member of
the Union. It does not by any means follow, because he has all the rights and
privileges of a citizen of a State, that he must be a citizen of. the United
States. He may have all of the rights and privileges of the citizen of a State,
and yet not be entitled to the rights and privileges of a citizen in any other
State. For, previous to the option of the conshtution of the United States,
every State had the undoubted right to confer on whomsoever it pleased the
character of citizen, and to endow him with all its rights. But this character
of course was confined to the boundaries of the State, and gave him no rights
or privileges in other States beyond those secured to him by the laws of
nations and the comity of States. Nor have the several States surrendered the
power of conferring these rights and privileges by adopting the constitution of
United States...
It is very clear,
therefore, that no State can, by any act or law of its own, passed since the
adoption of the constitution, introduce a new member into the political
community created by the constitution of the United States. It cannot make him
a member of this community by making him a member of its own. And for the same
reason it cannot introduce any person, or description of persons, who were not
intended to be embraced in this new political family, which the constitution
brought into existence, but were intended to be excluded from it.
The question then
arises, whether the provisions of the constitution, in relation to the personal
rights and privileges to which the citizen of a State should be entitled,
embraced the negro African race, at that time in this country, or who might
afterwards be imported, who had then or should afterwards be made free in any
State; and to put it in the power of a single State to make him a citizen of
the United States, and endue him with the full rights of citizenship in every
other State without consent? Does the constitution of the United States act
upon him whenever he shall be made free under the laws of a State, and raised
there to the rank of a citizen, and immediately clothe him with all the
privileges of a citizen in every other State, and in its own courts?
The court thinks
the affirmative of these propositions cannot be maintained. And if it cannot,
the plaintiff in error could not be a citizen of the State of Missouri, within
the meaning of the constitution of the United States, and, consequently, was
not entitled to sue in its courts.
It is true, every
person, and every class and description of persons, who were at the time of the
adoption of the constitution recognized as citizens in the several States, be-
came also citizens of this new political body; but none other; it was formed by
them, and for them and their posterity, but for no one else. And the personal
rights and privileges guaranteed to citizens of this new sovereignty were
intended to embrace those only who were then members of the several State
communities, or who should afterwards by birthright or otherwise become
members, according to the provisions of the constitution and the principles on
which it was founded.......................................
In the opinion of
the court the legislation and histories of the times, and the language used in
the declaration of independence, show, that neither the class of persons who
had been imported as slaves, nor their descendants, whether they had become
free or not, were then acknowledged as a part of the people, nor intended to be
included in the general words used in that memorable
instrument....................................
The government of
the United States had no right to interfere for any other purpose but that
protecting the rights of the owner, leaving it altogether with the several
States to deal with this race, whether emancipated or not, as each State may
think justice, humanity, and the interests and safety of society, require...
The act of
Congress, upon which the plaintiff relies, declares that slavery and
involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime, shall be forever
prohibited in all that part of the territory ceded by France, under the name of
Louisiana, which lies north of thirty-six degrees thirty minutes north latitude
and not included within the limits of Missouri. And the difficulty which meets
us at the threshold of this part of the inquiry is whether Congress was
authorized to pass this law under any of the powers granted to it by the
Constitution; for, if the authority is not given by that instrument, it is the
duty of this Court to declare it void and inoperative and incapable of
conferring freedom upon anyone who is held as a slave under the laws of any one
of the states...
We do not mean . .
. to question the power of Congress in this respect. The power to expand the
territory of the United States by the admission of new states is plainly given;
and in the construction of this power by all the departments of the government,
it has been held to authorize the acquisition of territory, not fit for
admission at the time, but to be admitted as soon as its population and
situation would entitle it to admission. It is acquired to become a state and
not to be held as a colony and governed by Congress with absolute Authority;
and, as the propriety of admitting a new state is committed to the sound
discretion of Congress, the power to acquire territory for that purpose, to be
held by the United States until it is in a suitable condition to become a state
upon an equal footing with the other states, must rest upon the same
discretional. . .
But the power of
Congress over the person or property of a citizen can never be a mere
discretionary power under our Constitution and form of government. The powers
of the government and the rights and privileges of the citizen are regulated
and plainly defined by the Constitution itself...........
These powers, and
others, in relation to rights of person, which it is not necessary here to
enumerate, are, in express and positive terms, denied to the general
government; and the rights of private property have been guarded with equal
care. Thus the rights of property are united with the rights of person and
placed on the same ground by the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, which
provides that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, and property
without due process of law. And an act of Congress which deprives a citizen of
the United States of his liberty of property, without due process of law,
merely because he came himself or brought his property into a particular
territory of the United States, and who had committed no offense against the
law, could hardly be dignified with the name of due process of
law...............................
It seems, however,
to be supposed that there is a difference between property in a slave and other
property and that different rules may be applied to it in expounding
Constitution of the United States. And the laws and usages of nations, and the writings
of eminent jurists upon the relation of master and slave and their mutual
rights and duties, and the powers which governments may exercise over it, have
been dwelt upon in the argument.
But, in
considering the question before us, it must be borne in mind that there is no
law of nations standing between the people of the United States and their
government and interfering with their relation to each other. The powers of the
government and the rights of the citizen under it are positive and practical
regulations plainly written down. The people of the United States have
delegated to it certain enumerated powers and forbidden it to exercise others.
It has no power over the person of property of a citizen but what the citizens
of the United States have granted. And no laws or usages of other nations, or
reasoning of statesmen of jurists upon the relations of master and slave, can
enlarge the powers of the government or take from the citizens the rights they
have reserved. And if the Constitution recognizes the right of property of the
master in a slave, and makes no distinction between that description of
property and other property owned by a citizen, no tribunal, acting under the
authority of the United States, whether it be legislative, executive, or judicial,
has a right to draw such a distinction or deny to it the benefit of the
provisions and guaranties which have been provided for the protection of
private property against the encroachments of the government.
Now, as we have
already said in an earlier part of this opinion, upon a different point, the
right of property in a slave is distinctly and expressly affirmed in the
Constitution. The right to traffic in it, like an ordinary article of
merchandise and property, was guaranteed to the citizens of the United States,
in every state that might desire it, for twenty years. And the
government in express terms is pledged to protect it in all future time if the
slave escapes from his owner. That is done in plain words--too plain to be
misunderstood. And no word can be found in the Constitution which gives
Congress a greater power over slave property or which entitles property of that
kind to less protection than property of any other description. The only power
conferred is the power coupled with the duty of guarding and protecting the
owner in his rights.
Upon these
considerations it is the opinion of the court that the act of Congress which
prohibited a citizen from holding and owning property of this kind in the
territory of the United States north of the line therein mentioned is not
warranted by the Constitution and is therefore void; and that neither Dred
Scott himself, nor any of his family, were made free by being carried into this
territory; even if they had been carried there by the owner with the intention
of becoming a permanent resident.
The Missouri Compromise
In April 1803 the
United States paid $15 million for the Louisiana Territory, an area comprising
the entire Mississippi drainage basin, which had been settled by the French in
the late seventeenth century. Debate erupted over the extension of slavery in
the region, and in 1819 the House of Representatives introduced legislation
authorizing statehood for Missouri while prohibiting the further introduction
of slavery into the new state.
In 1820 the
Missouri Compromise was reached, admitting Missouri to the Union as a slave
state with a slave population of almost 10,000, and Maine as a free state, with
the understanding that the future expansion of slavery would be prohibited
above the latitude of 36 33' N